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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine size management by European private firms for which disclosure requirements 
increase at size thresholds. Our estimates suggest at least 8% of firms near thresholds that impose 
income statement disclosure manage size downward, and the average firm that manages size 
sacrifices more than 6% of its assets. We find that multiple determinants of proprietary costs 
predict this behavior, and that size management to avoid mandatory audits, which are similarly 
imposed at size thresholds, is of comparable magnitude. Our results triangulate the economic 
significance of proprietary costs in a setting largely without confounding capital market, agency, 
or compliance costs.
                                                        
*
 We thank participants at the 2013 UBCOW Conference, the 2013 and 2014 EUFIN Conferences, the 2014 
Potsdam Auditing and UTS Accounting Research Workshops, the 2015 AAA and EAA Conferences, the 2015 
German Academic Association for Business Research Conference, the 2017 EARNet Conference, workshop 
participants at LMU Munich, Paderborn University, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Temple University, University of 
Bamberg, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, University of Münster, John Core (editor) and an anonymous reviewer 
at the Journal of Accounting and Economics, and Sudipta Basu, Larry Brown, Nicole Cade, Mara Cameran 
(discussant), Francesca Cesaroni, Jill Collis, Brigitte Eierle, Belén Fernández-Feijóo, Thomas M. Fischer, Luzi Hail, 
Daniel Hoang (discussant), Katerina Hellström, Klaus Henselmann, David Huguet, Zekiye Kaya, Bill Kinney, 
Robert J. Kirsch, Clive Lennox, Maximilian Müller (discussant), Sarah McVay, Lasse Niemi, Isabel Wang 
(discussant), and Brady Williams for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. This paper has also 
benefited from discussions with many country experts and practitioners. David Burgstahler gratefully acknowledges 
the generous financial support of the Dr. Theo and Friedl Schöller Foundation. 
 1
1. Introduction 
 Proprietary costs occur when disclosures reveal commercially sensitive information that 
is exploited by competitors to the detriment of the firm. These costs are fundamental in theory 
(e.g., Verrecchia, 1983). Yet their empirical importance remains an open question (e.g., Lang 
and Sul, 2014; Bens et al., 2011; Berger, 2011; Beyer et al., 2010; Berger and Hann, 2007). 
While the literature relates several firm and industry characteristics to decisions to withhold 
specific disclosures (e.g., Bernard, 2016; Ellis et al., 2012; Dedman and Lennox, 2009; Wang, 
2007; Verrecchia and Weber, 2006), inferences about economic significance are limited. 
Proprietary costs of disclosure are rarely observable, so it is seldom possible to directly estimate 
them. Inferring their scope and magnitude based on the cost incurred to avoid disclosure is also 
challenging. In most settings, the cost of avoidance is either very low or hard to estimate. 
Moreover, the relations studied typically capture proprietary costs pertaining only to a specific 
disclosure (such as segment information) and a specific firm characteristic (such as profitability) 
and do not address costs associated with more general financial statement information. Given 
these limitations, it is unclear whether proprietary costs matter only in the context of highly 
specific disclosures (and then are only of marginal importance) or are a key friction for general 
financial disclosure decisions. 
This paper provides evidence on the economic significance of proprietary costs of general 
financial statement disclosures. We examine private firms in Europe, where nearly all countries 
require limited liability firms to publicly disclose financial statement information but where firm 
size determines the extent of mandated disclosure. For the smallest firms, the requirements are 
typically minimal, but for larger firms that exceed bright-line thresholds, they can be substantial. 
Size thresholds similarly determine audit requirements: the smallest firms are generally exempt, 
but those exceeding bright-line size thresholds must have external audits (e.g., Kausar et al., 
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2016). Thus firms are likely to manage size downward whenever these mandates impose costs 
that exceed the costs of size management.1  
This setting allows us to identify the source of costs incurred to avoid disclosure and 
audit requirements and examine the magnitude and scope of these costs. Discontinuities in 
otherwise smooth distributions of size classification variables (total assets, sales, and number of 
employees) provide evidence of size management and allow us to construct estimates of its 
pervasiveness. Because the thresholds that impose disclosure and audit requirements that are 
based on the same size variables do not always coincide, we can separately identify and compare 
evidence of size management due to disclosure versus audit costs. Analogously, because 
different countries impose different disclosure requirements, we can separately identify and 
compare evidence of size management to avoid disclosure of information from the income 
statement, the cash flow statement, and other disclosures. In the spirit of similar analyses in the 
economics literature (e.g., Kleven and Waseem, 2013), we can also estimate the amount of 
growth sacrificed to manage size downward and avoid disclosure requirements. Based on 
estimates of costs of size management in the literature, we illustrate how to translate these 
amounts into costs as a proportion of income.  
The European private firm setting also allows us to sidestep many of the endogeneity 
concerns that bedevil the literature on proprietary costs (e.g., Shroff, 2016; Lang and Sul, 2014; 
Berger, 2011). Compliance costs, agency costs, and capital market incentives are often important 
determinants of public disclosure but are largely absent in our setting. European private firms, 
regardless of size, generally must prepare full accounts for shareholders and tax authorities, so 
incremental compliance costs imposed by additional public disclosure are de minimis. Because 
these firms generally have concentrated ownership and banks and other counterparties have 
                                                        
1
 Size management tactics impose financial and operational costs, such as the fees to factor receivables (to 
manage assets) or the premia to pay overtime (to manage employee count). We discuss these tactics in Section 2.2.  
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alternative access to their accounts and other information through private channels (Kaya, 2010; 
Dedman and Lennox, 2009), the effects of public disclosure on agency costs, such as perquisite 
consumption, are minimal. Finally, because these firms are private and rarely have imminent 
plans to go public, capital market incentives are essentially zero. To rule out most other 
endogeneity concerns, we rely on another novel characteristic of the institutional setting—
staggered shifts in the levels of the size thresholds set by regulators across countries. In essence, 
shifts in the thresholds over time allow us to identify the evidence of size management relative to 
the “normal” shapes of the distributions and validate that the evidence of size management shifts 
in conjunction with shifts in the threshold levels. Together, our setting and empirical design help 
isolate the role of proprietary costs and make it unlikely that the evidence can be attributed to 
factors other than disclosure and audit requirements imposed at the thresholds.  
To conduct the empirical tests, we draw data on private limited liability firms in 12 
European countries from the Bureau van Dijk database Amadeus. These countries make up the 
vast majority of economic activity in Europe, have high levels of data availability, and impose 
disclosure and external audit requirements at size thresholds, which we identify by manual 
search. We use the location of an observation immediately below (versus above) the size 
threshold as a proxy for size management and then model size management as a function of the 
disclosure and audit requirements imposed. The results show that size management is common 
and relates significantly to both public disclosure and audit requirements, findings that are robust 
to a number of alternative research design choices. 
We then refine the analysis to differentiate the effect of income statement disclosure from 
the effects of other disclosure requirements. Given the importance of information on 
performance to competitors (e.g., Tomy, 2018; Minnis and Shroff, 2017), we expect that size 
management is more common at thresholds that impose income statement disclosure. We find 
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evidence that size management is pervasive at these thresholds but not at other disclosure 
thresholds, including those that impose cash flow statement disclosure. The results suggest that 
at least 8% of firms that would otherwise be immediately above a threshold manage size to avoid 
income statement disclosure while at least 4% do so to avoid audit requirements. These findings 
indicate that, for many firms, proprietary costs of income statement disclosure are at least equal 
to audit costs, the direct fees for which are typically estimated to be at least 6% of earnings for 
small and medium European private firms (e.g., Kausar et al., 2016; Collis, 2008).2  
We provide additional evidence that size management to avoid disclosure is largely due 
to proprietary costs. Size management is positively associated with proxies for profitability, 
growth, and leverage, consistent with theory and evidence that link these characteristics of 
private firms to greater proprietary costs (e.g., Bernard, 2016; Dedman and Lennox, 2009). The 
positive association with profitability and growth is inconsistent with the alternative view that 
the main motive for size management is to avoid disclosure to counterparties, as firms typically 
have incentives to reveal high growth or profitability to counterparties, such as suppliers, to 
obtain better terms of trade (Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2010; Huyghebaert, 2006). We 
also find that the evidence at disclosure thresholds (but not at audit thresholds) is concentrated in 
years after a European Commission Directive made financial disclosures generally available on 
websites, which made the disclosures more readily available to competitors.3  
Finally, we examine the average amount of asset size (i.e., growth) sacrificed to avoid 
disclosure and audit costs. We compare the shape (density) of the full pooled size distributions 
                                                        
2
 Survey evidence of small and medium European private firms shows audit fees are the most commonly cited 
concern about obtaining an audit (Minnis and Shroff, 2017). In addition, more than 40% of managers say they “do 
not see any benefit in having the financial statements audited,” suggesting audit fees are a lower bound of the net 
cost of an audit for a substantial proportion of firms.  
3
 Survey evidence also underscores the role of proprietary costs in our setting. For example, Minnis and Shroff 
(2017) survey managers of extremely small European private firms and find that proprietary costs of disclosure are 
widely perceived to be an important concern even for these firms; other concerns, such as disclosing financial 
information to customers, suppliers, friends, or relatives, are less frequently gauged to be important. 
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with estimated counterfactual size distributions that approximate the case of no size 
management, using an iterative empirical procedure based on Kleven and Waseem (2013). This 
approach relaxes the simplifying assumption in previous analyses that all size managers move 
from immediately above the threshold to immediately below; firms sometimes manage size by 
more than the width of one interval or manage size to intervals below the interval immediately 
below the threshold, as size management techniques are not always precise. Our estimates 
suggest that firms managing assets to avoid income statement disclosure on average sacrifice 
roughly 6.5% of total assets. To illustrate the potential cost of one common method of size 
management, we calculate that managing assets downward by 6.5% by factoring receivables and 
paying down debt with the proceeds translates into a direct cost of about 8% of earnings. 
The study contributes in several ways. We exploit a unique empirical setting in which the 
costs firms incur to avoid both expanded public disclosure and external audit requirements—
namely, the costs of managing size to stay small—are identifiable. In contrast to work that 
models disclosure or audit decisions as a function of proxies hypothesized to relate to higher 
disclosure or audit costs, we model size management as a direct function of the requirements 
themselves. Our approach allows us to gauge the pervasiveness and magnitude of disclosure and 
audit costs based on the costs firms incur to manage size while ensuring our estimates are not 
subject to many of the endogeneity concerns that pervade the literature. For example, we do not 
rely on the controversial conceptual relation between “competition” and proprietary costs, nor do 
our primary analyses rely on heavily criticized empirical proxies such as measures of industry 
concentration (e.g., Huang et al., 2017; Ali et al., 2014).  
Overall, our findings speak directly to concerns about the identification and economic 
significance of proprietary costs and suggest an important role for these costs in practice (e.g., Li 
et al., 2017; Shroff, 2016; Lang and Sul, 2014; Berger, 2011; Berger and Hann, 2007). Our 
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findings suggest that size management to avoid income statement disclosure is at least as 
common as that to avoid an audit, evidence that helps to benchmark the significance of 
proprietary costs and contextualize prior work on size management at audit thresholds (Kausar et 
al., 2016). Our results indicate that a reasonable estimate of the average cost incurred to avoid 
disclosure is a high single-digit percentage of earnings, although this cost is likely to vary 
substantially in the cross-section. In sum, proprietary costs appear to be inherent to fundamental 
financial statement disclosures, stretch across countries and institutional settings, and are 
anticipated and avoided even by small private firms, which are rarely studied, notwithstanding 
the prevalence of disclosure requirements for them (Badertscher et al. 2013). In these ways, 
proprietary costs appear to be fundamental, consistent with their central role in disclosure theory. 
The paper also contributes beyond the proprietary cost literature. Our study closely 
relates to the large literature that examines the management of economic variables around 
regulatory thresholds and benchmarks (e.g., Kausar et al., 2016; Kleven and Waseem, 2013; Gao 
et al., 2009; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). We develop a novel method of estimating size 
sacrificed due to different regulatory requirements imposed at size thresholds, which allows for 
comparisons of the requirements’ relative costs and could be extended to other settings. 
Similarly, our extensive manual collection of European regulatory requirements and thresholds, 
along with their effective dates and levels, should be useful to concurrent and future work that 
examines European private firms in the context of disclosure and audit regulation (e.g., 
Bassemir, 2017; Breuer et al., 2017; Minnis and Shroff, 2017; Kausar et al., 2016).  
2. Institutional background 
2.1. Disclosure and audit environment of European private firms 
 The disclosure and audit environment of European private firms is ultimately controlled 
by the individual national governments, which establish and enforce accounting and disclosure 
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requirements within a broad framework of European Commission Directives. European countries 
generally require smaller firms to comply with fewer of the requirements in EU Directives. To 
this end, each country implements its own rules to classify limited liability private firms into size 
categories (small, medium, or large) based on the value of three variables: year-end total assets, 
annual sales, and average number of employees during the fiscal year.4 Firms are usually 
assigned to a different size category when the values of two (or more) of the three size variables 
move across bright-line thresholds over two successive years. For example, a small firm moves 
up to become a medium firm as soon as at least two of three size variables exceed the small-
medium threshold for two consecutive years.  
Size classification determines two key requirements. First, size classification dictates the 
extent of public disclosure requirements. While all limited liability firms are required to disclose 
some financial information, disclosure requirements increase substantially with size. For 
instance, small firms in the UK and Germany must disclose (at a minimum) an abbreviated 
balance sheet but are not required to disclose an income statement. In contrast, medium and large 
firms must disclose an income statement with accompanying notes.  
For each of our 12 sample countries, Table 1 summarizes the main disclosure 
requirements for firms below versus above the small-medium threshold, and Appendix A 
provides further details. We focus on the small-medium threshold because the incremental 
increase in required disclosure at this threshold is generally substantially greater than at the 
medium-large threshold. Indeed, in many of the sample countries (e.g., the Scandinavian 
countries), the disclosure requirements shown in Table 1 and Appendix A for medium firms are 
                                                        
4
 Most accounting and disclosure requirements only apply to limited liability firms, so we can examine evidence 
of size management only for these firms. Accordingly, our conclusions may not generalize to firms that choose other 
legal structures. Nonetheless, private limited liability firms employ more than 60% of all persons in Europe (over 
70% when sole proprietorships are excluded), so these firms constitute a significant proportion of economic activity 
in their own right. See: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/bd_9ac_l_form_r2. 
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identical to those for large firms. Further, the much larger number of firms at the small-medium 
threshold makes it more likely that our tests have sufficient power to detect size management.  
Second, size classification dictates audit requirements. In most of Europe, limited liability 
private firms classified as medium or large are required to have an external audit every year, 
whereas firms classified as small are typically exempt from audit requirements. Appendix B 
provides detailed information on audit requirements for each sample country. Because audit 
requirements are often imposed at slightly different levels of the same underlying size variable in 
the same countries, size management to avoid audits offers a benchmark to gauge the relative 
significance of size management to avoid expanded disclosure. 
Table 2 lists the small-medium size thresholds in effect during our sample period (Jan. 1, 
2003, through Dec. 31, 2011) for the 12 sample countries, and Appendix C provides further 
details, including links to primary information sources for the levels and dates of implementation 
for the thresholds. Although all analyses are conducted in local currencies, for comparability 
across countries, we translate all non-euro threshold levels in Table 2 into euro using the average 
exchange rate for the period when the thresholds were in effect. The table shows that thresholds 
are updated frequently—generally to adjust for inflation and changes in other economic 
factors—though some countries update their thresholds more frequently than others. For 
countries that have updated their threshold levels, the assets and sales thresholds have generally 
been increased at a rate that has outpaced inflation. As a result, the proportion of firms exempt 
from audit or additional disclosure requirements has grown, consistent with concerns about 
imposing disclosure and audit costs on small and medium firms (European Commission, 2010; 
DTI, 1995). There has not been a corresponding relaxation over time in the employee 
threshold—the small-medium threshold for employees is 50 in most countries and did not 
change in almost all countries from the beginning of our sample period.  
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2.2. Management of size classification variables  
Firms have a menu of tactics available to manage size-classification variables downward 
(e.g., Kaya, 2010). Some methods, which tend to be emphasized in the European practitioner 
literature, are focused on only one of the variables. For example, to manage assets downward, 
some firms factor receivables—that is, sell their receivables at a discount—and use the proceeds 
to pay down debt. Depending on industry, creditworthiness, and other factors, factoring typically 
imposes direct costs of roughly 3%–4% of the gross receivables factored (e.g., Soufani, 2001). 
To manage employee count, some firms pay for overtime work or contract with outside agencies 
to supply labor. These methods tend to be costly given strict labor laws in most of Europe. For 
instance, the average overtime premium in the UK is roughly 40%, and in Germany, firms 
typically pay two to three times more for a temporary worker from an outside entity than for an 
employee (Holtbrügge, 2007; Kvasnicka, 2003; Pannenberg and Wagner, 2001; Bell and Hart, 
1999).5 To manage sales, firms can either delay sales, which risks creating supply chain 
problems for customers and merely defers the issue of maintaining sales below the threshold, or 
provide discounts, which directly reduce current profitability.  
Other methods affect more than one size variable. Some firms outsource business 
processes, which can reduce both total assets and employee count. For example, in most 
European countries, services are readily available for straightforward financial functions, such as 
payroll, billing, and processing of receivables and payables. However, these nonstandard 
employment relations are often costly and require substantial planning to establish. Another 
option is to split the firm, a method that reduces all three size variables. This method is relatively 
uncommon because, while it is the most effective, it also entails considerable transitional costs as 
                                                        
5
 As an example, suppose a UK firm pays employees a 40% overtime premium to avoid hiring an additional 
worker. Assuming an average annual wage of £30,000, the incremental cost to manage size would equal £12,000, 
which is roughly 15% of the median earnings of UK firms in the vicinity of the threshold during the sample period.  
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well as ongoing administrative and operational costs, such as the costs of keeping multiple sets 
of accounts every year and separate invoicing and payroll systems for each entity.6  
Some firms may also misreport to manage size downward. However, misreporting is 
unlikely to be common for several reasons. First, financial statements are the basis of tax filings 
in most of Continental Europe and therefore scrutinized by tax authorities (Burgstahler et al., 
2006). European tax authorities conduct regular audits, the results of which are often shared with 
regulators that monitor financial reporting and disclosure (e.g., Svanström, 2013). These 
mechanisms likely improve the reliability of the financials, consistent with work that shows 
stronger monitoring by tax authorities improves financial reporting (Hanlon et al., 2014).7 
Second, national laws penalize managers and directors for misleading or false financial 
reporting. For instance, under the 2006 Companies Act in the United Kingdom, directors are 
responsible for ensuring their companies keep appropriate records and prepare financial 
statements that give a “true and fair view” of their companies’ state of affairs. Managers can be 
disqualified from serving as directors for up to 15 years for violating these requirements. Under 
German law (Section 331 of the German Commercial Code), false reporting can result in 
financial penalties or imprisonment for up to three years.8 Third, misreporting to manage size 
conveys few additional benefits, as typical equity market benefits of misreporting are absent in 
the private firm setting. While these factors do not necessarily preclude misreporting, they imply, 
at a minimum, that size management via misreporting is costly to managers. 
                                                        
6
 For example, consider a German firm close to the size threshold that splits into two firms (i.e., the existing and 
a newly incorporated firm). Transitional costs alone include registration fees at the commercial register for the new 
firm, fees for notarization of contracts such as memorandum of association, and fees related to tax issues, since 
splitting requires the firm to transfer assets and liabilities to a new firm, among other costs. By law (Steuerberater-
vergütungsordnung), these fees typically total well more than €20,000. 
7
 For example, in a given year, about 21% of German manufacturers are subject to a tax audit of the previous 
three years. See: http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Monatsberichte/2016/10/Inhalte/Kapitel-3-
Analysen/3-1-Ergebnisse-der-steuerlichen-Betriebspruefung-2015.html.  
8
 Criminal penalties are imposed in other countries as well. For a review of enforcement activities in 2011 in 
Ireland, for example, see: http://www.odce.ie/Portals/0/EasyDNNNewsDocuments/191/ODCE_AR2011_EN.pdf. 
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3. Hypotheses and related literature 
3.1. Size management to avoid disclosure costs 
Public disclosure of financial information to competitors can impose proprietary costs in 
a variety of ways. Competitors can use sales, gross profit, and operating profit disclosures from 
the income statement to evaluate entry into a product market or infer the success of a firm’s new 
or revamped product line, advertising campaign, or capacity expansion. Competitors can use 
knowledge of price changes, together with a rival’s financial statement disclosures, to better 
understand market sizes and price elasticities in specific segments. They can use income 
statement, balance sheet and notes disclosures to benchmark their own sales growth, production 
efficiency, SG&A costs, collection and payment periods, or investment in PP&E. Rivals can 
even use expanded balance sheet and cash flow statement disclosures to identify and prey on 
weaker rivals (e.g., Bernard, 2016; Chevalier, 1995). These possibilities are all consistent with 
managers’ stated concerns about the competitive implications of public disclosure requirements 
(e.g., Minnis and Shroff, 2017) as well as the economics literature that models endogenous 
information acquisition (Veldkamp, 2011; Hellwig and Veldkamp, 2009; Reis, 2006).  
Although papers study specific characteristics associated with proprietary costs, a number 
of factors limit conclusions about economic significance. Chief among these factors is that, in 
most empirical settings, the costs to avoid disclosure are small or difficult to estimate. For 
example, several papers show that managers withhold segment disclosures for highly profitable 
segments but provide no estimate of either the proprietary costs these disclosures impose or the 
cost incurred to withhold them (Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Harris, 1998). Other papers provide 
evidence that the costs of avoiding other specific disclosures are small. Verrecchia and Weber 
(2006) show that the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread is 2% higher for firms 
that redact information from material contract filings than for those that do not. Dedman and 
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Lennox (2009) examine medium UK private firms’ use of an exemption to disclose only gross 
profit without disclosing its components—sales and cost of goods sold. They find that the use of 
this exemption increases with perceptions of competition (based on a survey of sample firm 
managers) but also that nearly half of the firms in their sample choose to not incur the very small 
nominal cost (£100-250) to avoid more detailed disclosure. As they note, “[t]he low cost of non-
disclosure raises doubts about the economic significance of the decision to withhold information 
about sales and costs and the magnitude of the competitive costs of disclosure.” 
Other factors could also partly account for the limited evidence on the economic 
significance. In most settings (particularly those that rely on public firm data), the public 
disclosure choice relates to a highly specific incremental disclosure (such as segment data), 
whose importance may be small relative to the rich set of other information disclosed in the 
financials. Identification is another challenge, as in most settings disclosure avoidance can also 
reflect other factors, including capital market incentives, compliance costs, and agency costs 
(e.g., Berger, 2011). Studies also typically focus on assessing the statistical significance of the 
relation between disclosure decisions and a specific incentive theorized to be associated with 
higher competitive costs (e.g., Ellis et al., 2012). To what extent the disclosure decision entails 
proprietary costs, other than that specific incentive, is generally unclear. For example, while 
Bernard (2016) provides evidence that disclosure avoidance among private limited liability 
German firms increases with financial constraint, his estimates do not capture proprietary costs 
imposed by financial disclosure unrelated to financial constraint. Collectively, these limitations 
help account for Lang and Sul’s (2014) conclusion that “we know relatively little empirically 
about the likely prevalence and magnitude of proprietary costs in practice.” 
We provide evidence of the economic significance of proprietary costs using a setting 
and research design that avoids many of the limitations of prior work. Our study examines the 
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disclosure of fundamental financial statement information (e.g., disclosure of an income 
statement) by small private European firms, a setting where alternative sources of information 
are generally not available and disclosures are more clearly attributable to specific business 
activities and geographies. This setting also does not require claiming a specific incentive or set 
of incentives associated with higher competitive costs of disclosure; firms may manage size to 
minimize the risk of new competition, to thwart predatory behavior, or to mitigate any other 
proprietary cost. Put differently, because few extraneous factors can alternatively explain 
disclosure avoidance in this setting, we can isolate the effect of proprietary costs on size 
management while remaining agnostic about the exact sources of these costs. 
Of course, there are also factors that potentially limit the economic significance of the 
proprietary costs we examine. For example, owners of small private firms may not understand or 
anticipate proprietary costs. Similarly, their competitors may be too constrained or 
unsophisticated to exploit this information.9 On balance, then, whether proprietary costs of 
disclosure commonly outweigh the operational and financial costs of size management is an 
empirical question. Our first hypothesis, in alternative form: 
 H1: European private firms manage size to avoid incremental public disclosure of 
financial statement information. 
 
3.2. Size management to avoid audit costs  
The net cost of an audit is the gross cost (the sum of direct audit fees and other indirect 
costs, such as the time and effort incurred to provide information to auditors) less any offsetting 
benefits. Estimates of direct audit fees for small UK firms during our sample period range from 
£1,000 to £10,000, depending on the firm’s audit history, industry, and other factors (Kausar et 
al., 2016; Collis, 2008). For example, Kausar et al. (2016) estimate the average audit fees for 
                                                        
9
 Additionally, the costs of size management may not be entirely exogenous to proprietary costs. For example, 
firms that have greater growth than rivals may have greater proprietary costs of disclosure, but these firms may also 
face greater costs to stay small. We address this possibility further in Section 5.3. 
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their sample of small and medium UK private firms to be roughly £6,000 or 6% of average after-
tax earnings. Audit fees for Continental European firms are unavailable for many countries, 
including Germany and Austria, but appear to be of similar magnitude (approximately €7,000 on 
average) where they are available, such as in Spain (e.g., Gandia and Huguet, 2015). The indirect 
costs of an audit are hard to separately estimate for small private firms but are lessened by 1) the 
high level of book-tax conformity in Europe (because information provided for an audit often 
duplicates information provided for tax purposes) and 2) national laws that require firms to 
prepare full accounts for owners (because firms must keep reliable books and records, regardless 
of public disclosure or audit requirements). Nonetheless, the time and effort required to 
communicate with auditors is likely to be nontrivial. Consistent with this, Minnis and Shroff 
(2017) find that 54% of the private firm managers believe the time demands of auditors is an 
important concern in obtaining an audit.10 
The benefits that can offset the gross cost of an audit include reductions of monitoring, 
control, and contracting costs. The separation of ownership and control creates a demand for 
monitoring, and audits can substitute for other forms of monitoring by owners or company 
directors (Güntert, 2000). Consistent with this, Dedman et al. (2014) provide evidence that firms 
are more likely to purchase voluntary audits if they have greater agency costs or are riskier. 
Audits can improve managerial decision-making by providing assurance that the financial 
statement information used for planning and control purposes is reliable (Minnis and Shroff, 
2017). Audits also play a key role in reducing financing frictions by increasing the credibility of 
financial disclosures provided to capital providers. For example, Blackwell et al. (1998) and 
Minnis (2011) show that audits reduce debt contracting costs, and Minnis and Shroff (2017) find 
                                                        
10
 Although book-tax conformity and requirements for fair reporting likely constrain opportunistic reporting 
among small private firms, one additional cost that external audits may impose is the loss of reporting flexibility, 
which could serve to limit the usefulness of financial information revealed to competitors. However, survey 
evidence from Minnis and Shroff (2017) suggests that European private firm managers do not believe that 
competitors are one of the main beneficiaries of a financial statement audit.  
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that managers believe that lenders and creditors are among the top beneficiaries of financial 
statement audits.11 Two factors that could reduce the debt contracting benefits of an audit in 
Europe are the high level of book-tax alignment, which allows lenders to rely on scrutiny by tax 
authorities for some assurance that borrowers’ financials are fairly stated (Minnis and 
Sutherland, 2016; Hanlon et al., 2014), and the heavy reliance on relationship lenders, which can 
substitute alternative information for financial reporting (e.g., Kim et al., 2011).  
On balance, we expect the net cost of mandatory audits is nontrivial for most firms, 
notwithstanding the potential offsetting benefits. This expectation is based on the relatively low 
rates of voluntary audits among small and medium private firms documented elsewhere (e.g., 
less than 25% by Minnis (2011)), survey evidence that more than 40% of small and medium 
private firm managers see no benefit of an audit (Minnis and Shroff, 2017), and the decisions of 
regulators in many European countries to reduce the number of firms subject to mandatory audits 
by increasing audit thresholds over time. Kausar et al. (2016) provide direct evidence consistent 
with our expectation: they show that small and medium UK firms manage size variables 
downward in the early 2000s to avoid audit requirements. Given the relatively rich body of work 
that helps quantify audit costs for small private firms, evidence that the results of Kausar et al. 
(2016) generalize to subsequent years and other countries will provide an important benchmark 
to gauge the relative significance of size management to avoid disclosure requirements.  
Our second hypothesis, in alternative form: 
 H2: European private firms manage size to avoid mandatory audits. 
                                                        
11
 Using a sample of small US firms, Blackwell et al. (1998) show that firms that choose to be audited pay 
significantly lower interest rates than similar unaudited firms. In their sample, the interest savings from audits cover 
between 28% and 50% of typical audit fees. Minnis (2011) finds that audited firms enjoy significantly lower interest 
rates than unaudited firms (roughly 70 basis points, on average), with larger effects for smaller firms.  
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4. Sample selection and data 
4.1. Sample selection  
We obtain firm-year data from Amadeus, a Bureau van Dijk product that provides both 
financial and non-financial (e.g., employee count) data about public and private European firms 
(Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008; Burgstahler et al., 2006). Amadeus dramatically expanded its 
coverage of private firms in the early 2000s, so we focus on a nine-year period beginning in 
2003, when data availability increases substantially.  
We select observations from 12 countries with the largest number of observations 
available on Amadeus: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. Examining evidence of size management across a 
dozen countries reduces the probability that our conclusions are affected by any country-specific 
institutional factor. Further, by comparing evidence of size management at disclosure and audit 
thresholds for the same underlying size variable within countries, we minimize the possibility 
that any differences could be attributable to country-level institutional factors such as the quality 
of legal enforcement or book-tax alignment.  
Table 3 summarizes the selection criteria and their effects on sample attrition by country. 
We select (unconsolidated) financial statement accounts of firms not in a consolidated group 
(similar to Burgstahler et al., 2006), which yields about 46.6 million firm-year observations 
within the sample period (see Panel A). We then restrict the sample to private firms, as publicly 
traded firms are subject to extensive disclosure requirements, and to firms not in finance, 
insurance, or public administration (NAICS codes beginning with 52 and 92), as firms in these 
industries are often subject to other disclosure and audit requirements under national laws (e.g., 
Lennox and Pittman, 2011). We also exclude non-limited liability firms, as these firms are 
typically not subject to disclosure or audit requirements, as well as the few private firms that 
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voluntarily adopt International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to ensure financial 
statement comparability within each country. These selection requirements reduce the number of 
potential firm-years to about 37.2 million.  
We conduct our analyses at the size-variable level (as each firm-year observation 
corresponds to at most three observations of total assets, sales, and employee count), focusing on 
observations immediately below or above threshold levels at which disclosure or audit 
requirements are imposed. Most of our tests focus only on these observations, as most other 
observations provide little information about size management, either because there is no 
incentive to manage size (for observations far below the threshold) or because size management 
is too costly (for observations far above the threshold). To operationalize the concepts of 
“immediately above” and “immediately below,” we select bin sizes (i.e., interval widths) to be 
2% of the size threshold—large enough so the distributions of the size variables are smooth in 
the absence of size management but small enough so firms could manage the variables by the 
width of the interval at reasonably low cost. 
Our design necessitates two final selection criteria. First, we exclude observations at 
thresholds that do not permit 2% size bins. These thresholds consist of employee count 
thresholds less than 50, such as audit thresholds of 3 employees in Finland and Sweden or 12 
employees in Denmark. We also exclude observations with rounded data. Amadeus sometimes 
obtains approximate, rounded employee count and sales figures from sources other than 
company filings, such as from national credit bureau offices. It is necessary to exclude these 
estimates because rounding creates potential for false significance in tests of size management.12 
                                                        
12
 These cases are relatively easy to identify, as the size distributions exhibit large spikes that recur at levels 
corresponding to rounded values. The country-size variable combinations that exhibit rounding include Austria 
employee count, Austria sales, Finland employee count, Germany sales, and Netherlands employee count. 
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A total of 503,666 size-variable observations within 2% of the thresholds meet these 
criteria (see Table 3 Panel B). This sample includes observations within 2% of the disclosure and 
audit thresholds during years the thresholds are in effect as well as during years when they are 
not. For example, the sample includes German firm observations with assets within 2% of 
€4,015,000 for all years of the sample period, not just for years when audit and disclosure 
requirements were imposed at that level. In effect, this approach exploits the time-series 
variation in threshold levels set by regulators to construct a distributional counterfactual. The 
estimated effects of disclosure and audit requirements are therefore incremental to the “normal” 
slopes of the underlying size distributions, as well as any effects of time-invariant thresholds that 
impose other regulations at the same levels of the size variables. 
4.2. Unavailable data below certain sales and employee count thresholds 
For some thresholds based on sales and employee count, there is an inherent limitation in 
observing firms below the threshold. In every country, small firm disclosure requirements 
include at least an abbreviated balance sheet, and therefore total assets data are available 
regardless of firm size. However, in some countries, small firms are not required to report sales 
or employee count, whereas medium firms are. As a result, data are not fully available below 
these disclosure thresholds, which likely attenuates evidence of size management.  
In light of this inherent data limitation, we focus on subsamples for which data are fully 
observable on both sides of the threshold—assets data are disclosed above and below the 
threshold in all countries, and sales and employee count data are disclosed above and below the 
small-medium threshold in many countries, such as France, Sweden, and others. In a few cases, 
we broaden the analysis to include results for distributions affected by nondisclosure, because 
these distributions may still provide incremental evidence, albeit attenuated, of size management. 
Even though nondisclosure eliminates the effect of size management on excess observations in 
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the bin left of the threshold in the observable distributions, it does not eliminate the deficiency in 
the number of observations in the bin above the threshold, where the observations would have 
been had the firms not managed size downward.  
5. Empirical results 
We present four types of empirical evidence related to size management to avoid 
disclosure and audit requirements. First, to illustrate the underlying data, we present graphical 
and statistical evidence of size management for selected countries. Second, we develop and 
estimate a logit model to 1) differentiate size management to avoid disclosure versus size 
management to avoid audit requirements, 2) provide evidence on the type of financial statement 
disclosure that drives size management, and 3) develop estimates of the pervasiveness of size 
management. Third, we test predicted relations between size management and determinants of 
proprietary costs. Finally, we develop estimates of the magnitude of size management and 
illustrate the likely costs size management imposes. 
5.1. Evidence of size management at disclosure and audit thresholds 
 We first provide selected graphical and statistical evidence of size management. We do 
not present graphical and statistical evidence for all of the possible size distributions, as there are 
three size variables from 12 countries, and in most cases, two or three different thresholds were 
in effect during the sample period for each requirement. Instead, Section 5.1.1. focuses on one 
size variable (assets) in one country (the UK) and shows results separately for three different 
periods when different size thresholds were in effect. We focus on UK assets because the assets 
variable is disclosed regardless of firm size and because there is a relatively large number of 
observations available in the UK, which allows us to confirm that discontinuities occur at the 
threshold currently in effect (consistent with size management) but not at thresholds that were 
previously in effect (inconsistent with alternative explanations for discontinuities). In Section 
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5.1.2., we combine size distributions across time for the assets variable for four countries with 
high data availability where disclosure and audit thresholds coincide: Germany, Italy, Spain, and 
the UK. Together, these results provide evidence of the existence of size management across 
countries and periods and illustrate how discontinuities shift with changes in the size thresholds. 
5.1.1. Temporal variation in size management  
Fig. 1 presents distributions of unscaled UK assets during three different periods when 
different size thresholds were in effect (see Table 2). We use the standardized difference statistic 
for the interval immediately left of the threshold to assess the significance of the discontinuities 
at the thresholds (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Panels A–C show distributions at thresholds 
currently in effect. During each of the three periods, the standardized difference statistic is highly 
significant (as shown at the bottom of each panel), suggesting that UK private firms manage size 
below the threshold in effect.  
Panels D–F show the distributions at the threshold level in effect during the previous sub-
period as a falsification test in the spirit of Kausar et al. (2016). Intuitively, we would not expect 
to observe discontinuities at threshold levels no longer in effect if the discontinuities we identify 
are due to size management to remain below the threshold currently in effect. Consistent with 
this intuition, the distributions in Panels D–F show no evidence that firms manage size to remain 
below thresholds that are no longer in effect. For example, in Panel F there is no evidence that 
firms manage size to remain below £2.8 million after the threshold moved to £3.26 million 
starting April 5, 2009. Although we present these falsification tests only for total assets 
thresholds in the UK, untabulated tests for other size variables and other countries show similar 
results.13  
                                                        
13
 Specifically, the results show that discontinuities at assets and sales thresholds shift when the levels of the 
thresholds set by regulators shift, and we find no evidence of size management at assets and sales thresholds 
previously in effect. Of course, we cannot test for shifts for cases where there is not significant evidence of size 
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5.1.2. Cross-sectional variation in size management  
 Fig. 2 presents distributions for total assets in the vicinity of the corresponding active size 
thresholds for Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. Because the assets thresholds vary across time 
(see Table 2), we combine results across time by scaling by the period-specific threshold. The 
statistical significance of the discontinuities is again assessed using the standardized difference 
for the interval immediately below the threshold. 
The tenor of the evidence in Fig. 2 is that size management is common but varies 
significantly by country. We find strong evidence of size management in the UK and Germany,14 
somewhat weaker evidence for Spain, and no evidence for Italy, where both the disclosure and 
audit requirements imposed at the threshold are minimal (see Appendices A and B). Untabulated 
results suggest similar cross-country variation in size management for the other variables. For 
example, we find strong evidence of size management of the sales variable in Spain and the 
employee count variable in Germany, but little evidence of management of either sales or 
employee count in the UK.15  
5.2. Cross-country regressions and the pervasiveness of size management 
5.2.1. Primary specification and results 
To test our main hypotheses, we combine data across countries, years, size variables, and 
threshold values, retaining only observations in either the bin immediately below or immediately 
above the threshold. We then estimate the following logit model: 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
management, which often occur for country-size variable combinations with low sample sizes. We can only test for 
shifts in size management for a single employee count threshold (the disclosure threshold in France), but this test is 
confounded by overlapping labor law requirements imposed at both the previous (10 employee) and new (20 
employee) threshold.   
14
 Fig. 2 Panel D is a scaled combination of the distributions shown in Fig. 1 Panels A–C. 
15
 Variation in size management across size variables, countries, and time is difficult to predict because multiple 
factors affect size management. For example, differences in institutional factors and changes in macroeconomic 
conditions create variation in the cost of managing each variable. Law changes that alter the levels of the size 
thresholds relative to one another also matter, as the relative levels of the thresholds affect which threshold is most 
binding for the average firm.  
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(1) Below	threshold, = γ + γ ∗ Expanded	disclosure, + γ ∗ External	audit, + ε, 
where i indexes the firm and t the sample year. The dependent variable is a probabilistic proxy 
for size management that equals one if the observation is in the bin immediately below the 
threshold and zero if it is immediately above. The regressors are indicator variables for the 
imposition of an expanded financial statement disclosure requirement or an external audit 
requirement at the threshold in year t. Because distributions of size variables tend to slope 
downward even in the absence of size management, we expect γ to be slightly greater than zero. 
Our hypotheses suggest that requirements for expanded disclosures or external audits partly 
explain variation in size management. Specifically, γ > 0 constitutes evidence consistent with 
H1, and γ > 0 constitutes evidence consistent with H2. 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating Eq. (1). Columns 1 and 2 present the baseline 
specification without and with country-year fixed effects, respectively. The inclusion of country-
year fixed effects helps to address concerns that time-varying (or time-invariant) country-level 
factors, such as the level of enforcement, book-tax conformity, civil tradition, etc. can account 
for the findings (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998). The specifications in columns 3-5 focus only on 
observations not subject to the effects of employee count and sales nondisclosure. Column 3 
excludes observations of sales or employee count where disclosure of the size variable is not 
required below the threshold but is required above the threshold. Column 4 excludes all 
observations of sales and employee count and instead focuses only on results for the assets 
variable, which tends to have the largest available sample size, is least subject to the confounding 
effects of data nondisclosure, and has few, if any, other regulatory requirements unrelated to 
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disclosure and audit requirements imposed at size thresholds based on it.16 Column 5 presents the 
same specification as column 4 but drops country-year fixed effects. 
Across all specifications, the results provide consistent evidence of size management at 
both expanded disclosure and external audit thresholds. The estimated coefficients on expanded 
disclosure in Table 4 are significant at the 5% level or better and the coefficients are relatively 
consistent in magnitude across the specifications, suggesting the results are not highly sensitive 
to data nondisclosure issues. The evidence of size management at audit thresholds is similarly 
consistent. The coefficients on external audit are significant at the 1% level or better in each 
specification and are also relatively consistent in magnitude. Together, the results provide 
support for both H1 and H2.  
While there are minor differences across countries in the external audit requirements 
imposed at size thresholds (see Appendix B), there are substantial differences in the requirements 
for disclosure of financial statement information (see Table 1 and Appendix A). In some 
countries, firms above the disclosure threshold must disclose an abbreviated income statement, 
whereas firms below it do not. In other countries, firms both above and below the threshold must 
disclose an income statement, so the incremental disclosure requirement is smaller. Similarly, in 
some countries cash flow statement disclosure is required above the threshold but not below, 
while in other countries cash flow statements are not required either above or below. Given prior 
evidence that firm performance is of particular interest to competitors (e.g., Minnis and Shroff, 
2017; Dedman and Lennox, 2009), we expect to find stronger evidence of size management at 
thresholds that impose income statement disclosure. We might also expect cash flow statement 
disclosure to impose additional proprietary costs, as the cash flow statement is a useful source of 
information on changes in the firm’s liquidity, a key component of financial constraint (e.g., 
                                                        
16
 In contrast, other regulatory requirements are sometimes based on sales or employee count size thresholds. For 
example, in several countries, labor law requirements are imposed at thresholds based on employee count. 
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Bernard, 2016). There may be still different costs imposed by disclosure of other types of 
financial statement information, such as the disaggregation of certain income statement and 
balance sheet accounts (e.g., Dedman and Lennox, 2009). Thus, to examine whether 
heterogeneity in the extent of size management corresponds to these differences in disclosure 
requirements imposed at size thresholds, we adjust Eq. (1) to decompose the expanded disclosure 
indicator into separate indicators for income statement disclosure, cash flow statement 
disclosure, and other disclosures.  
In Table 5, we present the results of Eq. (1) after decomposing the expanded disclosure 
indicator variable. The coefficient on income statement disclosure is significant at the 5% level 
or better in each specification, whereas the coefficients on cash flow statement disclosure and on 
other disclosures are much lower magnitude and are generally not significant. Evidence that 
external audits are associated with greater size management remains highly significant across the 
various specifications. Overall, the decomposition in Table 5 suggests that significant evidence 
of size management to avoid disclosure is driven primarily by cases where the additional 
required disclosure is income statement information rather than cash flow or other financial 
statement information.17 
To interpret the economic significance of the findings, we translate the implied marginal 
effects of the estimated regression coefficients into estimates of the proportion of firms that 
manage size due to the regulation imposed. We first make the simplifying assumption that firms 
above the threshold must manage each size variable downward to remain classified as small, an 
assumption not strictly true, because the size classification criteria are based on the values of two 
of three variables in consecutive years. We focus on column 5 of Table 5, the specification least 
                                                        
17
 The absence of evidence of size management to avoid disclosures other than the income statement helps 
validate our assumption that compliance costs are unlikely to explain disclosure avoidance in our setting. For 
example, if financial statement preparation costs were the primary driver of size management, firms would likely 
manage size to avoid cash flow statement disclosure as well as income statement disclosure. 
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subject to data nondisclosure issues and confounding effects that also excludes country-year 
fixed effects (which allows for estimates not relative to country-year averages). Untabulated 
marginal effects show that approximately 8% of firms immediately above the threshold manage 
assets to immediately below the threshold due to income statement disclosure requirements.18 
For comparison, we estimate that about half as many firms, approximately 4%, manage assets 
due to external audit requirements. Because firms could also manage some combination of sales 
and employee count in addition to assets, these estimates suggest that at least 8% of firms in the 
vicinity of the small-medium threshold manage size to avoid income statement disclosure.19 
These results underscore the perceived costs of disclosing performance information among small 
firms, even in comparison to the costs of audit mandates. 
5.2.2. Supplemental analyses 
 We conduct several additional (untabulated) tests to validate our results. First, we 
examine the effects of reasonable alternative design choices. We find that the results in Tables 4 
and 5 are robust to using bin sizes for assets and sales that are 1% or 3% of the threshold, rather 
than 2%, and the inclusion of multiple control variables. For example, inferences are unchanged 
if we control for country-year GDP growth, country-year inflation, and the number of 
observations in bins adjacent to the threshold (to account for the threshold’s location along the 
size distribution), none of which have statistically significant explanatory power in any of our 
                                                        
18
 This estimate equals the difference between the predicted proportion of firms below the threshold, given 
income statement disclosure is imposed at the threshold, less the predicted proportion, given income statement 
disclosure is not imposed (i.e., the marginal effect), scaled by the unconditional proportion of observations above the 
threshold. In this case, the marginal effect (the numerator) is roughly 4%, and the denominator is roughly 50%.  
19
 Our estimate of the pervasiveness of size management likely understates the propensity to manage size for 
another reason: the number of firms above the threshold with a potential incentive to manage size is a subset of the 
actual number above the threshold, because the size classification criteria are based on multiple variables in 
consecutive years. Approximately two-thirds of firms immediately above total assets thresholds that impose income 
statement disclosure requirements still do not disclose income statement information (untabulated), which suggests 
the incentive to manage size downward is binding for only one-third of the observations above the threshold. This 
implies that when the total assets threshold is binding, at least 24% (8% divided by one-third) of firms manage 
assets due to income statement disclosure requirements.  
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tests. The results are also robust to excluding observations at inactive thresholds, so identifying 
variation is strictly from observations at thresholds during periods they are in effect. 
Second, we test for an increase in size management at income statement disclosure 
thresholds after a European Commission Directive (2003/53/EG) mandated limited liability 
private firms make their financial statement information available as electronic filings beginning 
Jan. 1, 2007. Before 2007, in many countries, interested parties had to visit local commercial 
registries to obtain physical copies of firms’ financial disclosures. Thus online filing beginning in 
2007 likely increased proprietary costs of disclosure by reducing the costs for rivals to access 
financial disclosures. Consistent with this conjecture, in untabulated tests we find that income 
statement disclosure requirements are associated with significant evidence of size management 
for years 2007–2011 (p < 0.01) but not for years before 2007. If this change were due to general 
time trends related to data availability, costs of size management, or other factors, we would 
expect to find a similar pattern of significance at audit thresholds. In fact, we find that external 
audit requirements are associated with size management both for 2007–2011 and for years before 
2007 (p < 0.01). In combination, these results are consistent with the interpretation that evidence 
of size management at disclosure thresholds is due to costs of disclosure, not some unidentified 
correlated omitted factor.  
Third, as related evidence on the propensity to avoid disclosure of income statement 
information, we also collect an extensive random sample of original filings to examine how 
frequently firms that are not required to disclose an income statement nonetheless choose to do 
so voluntarily. For this analysis, we inspect original filings, as size classification cannot be 
determined with 100% accuracy from Amadeus data alone. Our sample includes 1,000 firm-
years from the UK and 1,000 firm-years from Germany, the two largest countries that impose 
income statement disclosure at the threshold. We randomly draw these observations from the 20 
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bins below the assets threshold. The use of 20 bins below the threshold ensures the level of 
voluntary disclosure we observe is broadly representative of firms not required to disclose but 
also excludes very small firms far below the thresholds. We find that only about 9% of these 
firms below the small firm threshold voluntarily disclose an income statement. The low rate of 
voluntary disclosure is consistent with that observed by private companies in the US and 
contrasts with the higher rate obtaining voluntary audits (slightly more than 20%).  
5.3. Determinants of the choice to manage size 
In this section, we examine the relation between the probability of size management and 
characteristics previously associated with proprietary costs. To maximize the power of the test, 
we again restrict our focus to the UK assets threshold, where size management is pervasive, data 
nondisclosure unlikely, and the sample size large. We limit the sample to observations within 2% 
of each assets threshold while it was in effect and exclude observations with low revealed 
incentives to manage size to avoid disclosure—those above the threshold that do not disclose 
income statement information as well as those below that do.20 We then estimate Eq. (2): 
(2) Below	threshold, = β + β ∗ Change	in	firm	equity,&	'	& + β ∗ Assets	growth,&	'	& +
																																																β) ∗ Noncurrent	liabilities,& + Controls +	ε, 
 
where the dependent variable is defined as in Eq. (1). Consistent with work on proprietary costs 
(Minnis and Shroff, 2017; Bernard, 2016; Dedman and Lennox, 2009), we expect the probability 
that an observation falls immediately below the threshold (consistent with size management) 
increases with firm performance, growth, and financial constraint. Because income statement 
data are missing for a large proportion of firms, we rely on a balance sheet proxy for firm 
                                                        
20
 Because the purpose of this analysis is to understand why firms manage size, we focus only on firms that 
plausibly faced a choice whether to manage size to avoid disclosure. Thus we exclude firms for which the assets 
threshold is not a binding determinant of size classification as well as firms below the threshold that voluntarily 
disclose income statement information. 
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performance—the change in total equity, scaled by total assets.21 We proxy for growth using the 
change in total assets, scaled by total assets, and for financial constraint using noncurrent 
liabilities, scaled by total assets. Thus prior evidence leads us to predict β, β, and β) > 0. 
We also include control variables reflecting various factors studied in the proprietary 
costs literature and the literature on voluntary audits, including industry concentration, public 
firm presence, asset intangibility, firm age, inventory and fixed asset intensity, and ownership 
dispersion. We capture industry concentration using a Herfindahl index formed by four-digit 
NAICS code, based on the total assets of UK firms with publicly disclosed financial statements 
(e.g., Bernard, 2016; Dedman and Lennox, 2009). We capture the presence of public rivals using 
the percentage of total assets in the four-digit NAICS code held by public firms (e.g., 
Badertscher et al., 2013) and ownership dispersion using the total number of shareholders of the 
firm (e.g., Dedman et al., 2014). Asset intangibility, inventory intensity, and fixed asset intensity 
are the intangible assets, inventory, and fixed assets of the firm, scaled by total assets (e.g., 
Dedman et al., 2014; Ellis et al., 2012; Minnis, 2011).  
All explanatory variables are measured using lagged values to abstract from any 
mechanical relations arising from the costs of size management in year t (e.g., lower profitability 
due to factoring receivables).22 Explanatory variables in levels are measured in t-1; those in 
changes are measured between t-2 to t-1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 5% and 
95% levels to minimize the influence of outliers, consistent with the higher levels of 
winsorization often used to deal with extreme values that are common in studies of private firms 
(e.g., Gao et al., 2013; Minnis, 2011). 
                                                        
21
 Operating income scaled by total assets and the change in firm equity scaled by total assets have a positive 
correlation of roughly 0.50 among observations for which data on operating profits are non-missing.  
22
 If the firm manages size in multiple years, then the costs of size management could affect explanatory 
characteristics in subsequent years. Our results are robust to only including observations of firms the first year they 
are in the sample. 
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The results are presented in Table 6. In all specifications, the change in firm equity, assets 
growth, and noncurrent liabilities are significantly positively related to the probability that the 
firm falls in the interval immediately below (rather than immediately above) the threshold in the 
following year. These findings are consistent with evidence that private firms seek to avoid 
disclosing financial statement information about performance, growth, and financial constraint to 
competitors (Minnis and Shroff, 2017; Bernard, 2016; Dedman and Lennox, 2009).23 These 
results are not easily explained by incentives to manage size to avoid a mandatory audit or to 
avoid disclosure to other parties, such as suppliers or customers. For example, Minnis (2011) 
finds no relation between leverage or growth and the probability of obtaining a voluntary audit, 
and Dedman et al. (2014) find some evidence of a positive relation between leverage and the 
probability of obtaining a voluntary audit. Similarly, prior work shows that firms typically have 
incentives to reveal high growth or profitability to obtain better terms of trade from 
counterparties (Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2010; Huyghebaert, 2006). Overall, these 
findings are consistent with our interpretation that it is largely competitive reasons that drive 
many firms to limit their size.  
5.4. Size sacrificed to stay small 
We next construct estimates of the amount of size that size managers sacrifice to avoid 
disclosure and audit costs. Whereas our previous analyses focus strictly on the intervals 
immediately adjacent to the threshold (i.e., within 2% of the threshold), size management may 
also affect bins further from the threshold. For example, some firms more than 2% above the 
threshold may manage size to move below the threshold if disclosure is particularly costly. 
                                                        
23
 The coefficients on the control variables generally align with our expectations. For example, like Dedman and 
Lennox (2009) and Bernard (2016), we find mixed results on the effect of industry concentration. Like Bernard 
(2016), we find mixed results on the effect of public firm presence and a positive relation between the firm’s year of 
incorporation and disclosure avoidance. We also find that inventory intensity and fixed asset intensity positively 
predict size management. This is consistent with our expectation that firms with higher levels of fixed assets and 
inventory have more flexibility to manage size (e.g., firms with high levels of fixed assets have the ability to 
outsource asset-intensive business processes). 
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Similarly, because size management tactics are not always precise, some firms may manage to 
bins more than 2% below the threshold. By presenting evidence on the average size firms 
sacrifice to avoid disclosure and audit costs, we can provide more comprehensive estimates of 
the economic significance of these costs.    
To conduct the analysis, we focus on the total assets size variable. Assets data are 
available for almost all firms, whereas observations below sales and employee count disclosure 
thresholds are sometimes not disclosed (as discussed in Section 4.2.). We use an empirical 
method that allows us to use assets data from all countries to estimate from which bins to the 
right of the threshold the excess mass left of threshold originates. To illustrate using the UK as 
an example, Figure 2 Panel D appears to show that some UK firms manage assets from bins 
more than 2% above the threshold, and at least some firms manage assets to bins more than 2% 
below the threshold. Our empirical method first models the effects of income statement 
disclosure and audit requirements on the density of the distribution in a range of bins 
surrounding the threshold and then calculates the average size managed under the counterfactual 
assumption of smoothness in the vicinity of the threshold. Put differently, we estimate the 
average size sacrificed based on the intuition that the excess number of observations below the 
threshold in the observed distribution should equal the deficiency in the number of observations 
above the threshold. We provide a technical description of our approach in Appendix D. 
The results of this estimation procedure suggest firms that manage assets downward do 
so by an average of 3.24 bins, or about 6.5% of the assets thresholds, to avoid income statement 
disclosure, and by an average of 3.35 bins, or about 6.7% of the assets thresholds, to avoid 
external audit requirements.24 The estimated amounts managed as a percentage of the threshold 
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 The results also validate the intuition that a greater proportion of firms managing size come from bins closer to 
the threshold, and most manage size to the bin immediately below the threshold. For example, the results in Panel A 
of Appendix D suggest that, of the total 0.0037 excess density below the threshold, 68% (0.0025/0.0037) is in the 
 31
can be translated into estimates of the potential costs to manage size for each country-threshold 
combination. As an example, consider a UK firm in 2006 with total assets of £2,982,000. 
Suppose this firm factors receivables of £182,000 (6.5% of the threshold of £2,800,000) and pays 
creditors with the proceeds to reduce its total assets below the disclosure threshold. Based on a 
total factoring charge of 3%–4% (e.g., Soufani, 2001), the direct cost of managing size would 
equal roughly £5,460–£7,280, which equates to approximately 7%–9% of the median income of 
UK firms in the vicinity of the threshold. This estimated cost is quite similar to the implied cost 
of managing size to avoid a mandatory audit as well as the typical direct costs of an audit for 
private UK firms documented elsewhere (e.g., Kausar et al., 2016).  
6. Conclusion 
 While studies generally suggest that competitive concerns lead managers to withhold 
disclosures (e.g., for highly profitable segments), few estimate either the proprietary costs these 
disclosures impose or the costs managers incur to withhold them (e.g., Huang et al., 2017; Bens 
et al., 2011; Berger and Hann, 2007; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Harris, 1998). We complement 
this literature by examining the economic significance of proprietary costs among small 
European private firms for which general financial statement disclosure requirements increase at 
bright-line size thresholds. This setting allows us to identify the source of the costs firms incur to 
avoid disclosure—namely, the costs of size management—and also minimize concerns that 
disclosure avoidance could be due to other factors, such as agency costs, compliance costs, or 
capital market incentives. Staggered time-series shifts in the disclosure and audit thresholds set 
by regulators further lessen concerns about endogeneity. Thus our setting and empirical design 
allow us to triangulate evidence on the magnitude and prevalence of proprietary costs associated 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
first interval below the threshold, 27% (0.0010/0.0037) is in the second interval below, and 5% (0.0002/0.0037) is in 
the third interval below. 
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with fundamental financial disclosures in ways not possible in previous papers, including those 
that examine incremental determinants of proprietary costs among private firms (e.g., Bernard, 
2016; Dedman and Lennox, 2009). 
The results suggest that European private firms manage size downward at bright-line size 
thresholds that impose expanded disclosure—in particular, income statement disclosure—and 
external audit requirements. Our empirical estimates imply that at least 8% of firms that would 
otherwise be immediately above size thresholds manage size to avoid income statement 
disclosure, a rate similar to or even greater than that to avoid mandatory audits, which prior 
studies show are non-trivially costly for European private firms (e.g., Kausar et al., 2016). Cross-
sectional tests and an analysis of the determinants of size management, together with prior 
archival and survey evidence, point to proprietary costs as an important driver of size 
management. We also estimate that the costs of public income statement disclosure are 
substantial enough to lead firms that manage size to sacrifice, on average, roughly 6.5% of their 
asset size, which corresponds to approximately 7%–9% of income. 
Overall, the evidence suggests an important role for proprietary costs in practice. 
Managers of even small European firms appear to anticipate these costs and incur substantial 
operational and financial costs to avoid them. These findings complement the empirical literature 
that examines incremental determinants of proprietary costs and speak directly to the importance 
of these costs as a friction in disclosure theory, particularly as they arise from fundamental 
financial disclosures such as the income statement. The evidence also speaks directly to 
policymakers’ concerns about the costs of regulations imposed on small firms (European 
Commission, 2010) and extends work in other areas that suggests bright-line size thresholds 
create an incentive to stay small (e.g., Gao et al., 2009).  
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Appendix A: Disclosure Requirements for European Private Firms 
 
This appendix summarizes the disclosure requirements for private European limited liability firms below and above the small-
medium disclosure threshold.  
 
Below disclosure threshold Above disclosure threshold 
Austria 
Balance Sheet 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate subcategories of items on the balance sheet. 
For instance, an abbreviated balance sheet does not provide 
information on components of intangible assets (e.g., self-
developed intangible assets, goodwill) or inventories (e.g., raw 
materials, work in progress), and does not separately disclose 
current and long-term liabilities. 
Expanded abbreviated format 
Firms are required to report subcategories of some 
balance sheet items (e.g., trade receivables, trade 
payables).  
Income 
Statement No disclosure requirement 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate certain items (e.g., sales, increase 
or decrease in finished goods, own work capitalized, 
cost of materials) to gross profit.  
Other 
disclosures Abbreviated notes Expanded abbreviated notes; director’s report 
   
Belgium 
  
Balance Sheet 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate subcategories of items on the balance sheet. 
For instance, an abbreviated balance sheet does not provide 
information on components of inventories (e.g., raw materials, 
work in progress).  
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Income 
Statement 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate certain items (e.g., sales, cost of materials) to 
gross profit. Information on items such as increase or decrease in 
finished goods and own work capitalized can be omitted.  
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Other 
disclosures Abbreviated notes Full notes; director’s report 
   
Denmark 
  
Balance Sheet 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate subcategories of items on the balance sheet. 
For instance, an abbreviated balance sheet does not provide 
information on components of intangible assets (e.g., self-
developed intangible assets, goodwill) or inventories (e.g., raw 
materials, work in progress), and does not separately disclose 
current and long-term liabilities. 
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Income 
Statement 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate certain items (e.g., sales, cost of sales, other 
operating income) to gross profit.  
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Other 
disclosures Abbreviated notes Full notes; director’s report 
   
Finland 
  
Balance Sheet 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate subcategories of items on the balance sheet. 
For instance, an abbreviated balance sheet does not provide 
information on components of intangible assets (e.g., self-
developed intangible assets, goodwill) or inventories (e.g., raw 
materials, work in progress), and does not separately disclose 
current and long-term liabilities. 
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Income 
Statement 
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Other 
disclosures Expanded abbreviated notes Full notes; cash flow statement; director's report 
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France 
  
Balance Sheet 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate subcategories of items on the balance sheet. 
For instance, an abbreviated balance sheet does not provide 
information on components of intangible assets (e.g., self-
developed intangible assets, goodwill) or inventories (e.g., raw 
materials, work in progress), and does not separately disclose 
current and long-term liabilities. 
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Income 
Statement 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can withhold information about few items (e.g., income from 
long-term transactions or cost of materials).  
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Other 
disclosures Abbreviated notes Full notes; director’s report 
   
Germany 
  
Balance Sheet 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate subcategories of items on the balance sheet. 
For instance, an abbreviated balance sheet does not provide 
information on components of intangible assets (e.g., self-
developed intangible assets, goodwill) or inventories (e.g., raw 
materials, work in progress), and does not separately disclose 
current and long-term liabilities. 
Expanded abbreviated format 
Firms are required to report subcategories of some 
balance sheet items (e.g., trade receivables, trade 
payables).  
Income 
Statement No disclosure requirement 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate certain items (e.g., sales, increase 
or decrease in finished goods, own work capitalized, 
other operating income, cost of materials) to gross 
profit.  
Other 
disclosures Abbreviated notes Expanded abbreviated notes; director’s report 
   
Ireland 
  
Balance Sheet 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate subcategories of items on the balance sheet. 
For instance, an abbreviated balance sheet does not provide 
information on components of intangible assets (e.g., self-
developed intangible assets, goodwill) or inventories (e.g., raw 
materials, work in progress), and does not separately disclose 
current and long-term liabilities. 
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Income 
Statement No disclosure requirement 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate certain items (e.g., sales, cost of 
sales, other operating income) to gross profit. 
Other 
disclosures Abbreviated notes Expanded abbreviated notes; director’s report 
   
Italy 
  
Balance Sheet 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate subcategories of items on the balance sheet. 
For instance, an abbreviated balance sheet does not provide 
information on components of intangible assets (e.g., self-
developed intangible assets, goodwill) or inventories (e.g., raw 
materials, work in progress), and does not separately disclose 
current and long-term liabilities. 
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Income 
Statement 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate certain items (e.g., increase or decrease in 
finished goods, increase or decrease of contract work capitalized).  
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Other 
disclosures Abbreviated notes Full notes; director’s report 
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Netherlands 
  
Balance Sheet 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate subcategories of items on the balance sheet. For 
instance, an abbreviated balance sheet does not provide information 
on components of intangible assets (e.g., self-developed intangible 
assets, goodwill) or inventories (e.g., raw materials, work in 
progress), and does not separately disclose current and long-term 
liabilities. 
Expanded abbreviated format 
Firms are required to report subcategories of some 
balance sheet items (e.g., trade receivables, trade 
payables).  
Income 
Statement No disclosure requirement 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate certain items (e.g., sales, increase or 
decrease in finished goods, own work capitalized, other 
operating income, cost of materials) to gross profit.  
Other 
disclosures Abbreviated notes Expanded abbreviated notes; director’s report 
   
Spain 
  
Balance Sheet 
Abbreviated format 
Before 2008, firms could aggregate subcategories of items on the 
balance sheet. For instance, an abbreviated balance sheet did not 
provide information on components of intangible assets (e.g., self-
developed intangible assets, goodwill). Since 2008, firms are required 
to report subcategories of some items (e.g., trade receivables, trade 
payables).  
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Income 
Statement 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can withhold information about few subcategories of items 
(e.g., other operating expenses).  
Abbreviated format 
Firms can withhold information about few subcategories 
of items (e.g., other operating expenses).  
Other 
disclosures Abbreviated notes; abbreviated statement of equity changes 
Expanded abbreviated notes; cash flow statement; 
director’s report; statement of equity changes 
   
Sweden 
  
Balance Sheet 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate subcategories of items on the balance sheet. For 
instance, an abbreviated balance sheet does not provide information 
on components of intangible assets (e.g., self-developed intangible 
assets, goodwill) or inventories (e.g., raw materials, work in 
progress), and does not separately disclose current and long-term 
liabilities. 
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Income 
Statement 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate certain items (e.g., increase or decrease in 
finished goods, own work capitalized, other operating income, cost of 
materials) to gross profit.  
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Other 
disclosures Abbreviated notes Full notes; cash flow statement; director’s report 
   
United Kingdom 
 
Balance Sheet 
Abbreviated format 
Firms can aggregate subcategories of items on the balance sheet. For 
instance, an abbreviated balance sheet does not provide information 
on components of intangible assets (e.g., self-developed intangible 
assets, goodwill) or inventories (e.g., raw materials, work in 
progress), and does not separately disclose current and long-term 
liabilities. 
Full format 
No option to aggregate items 
Income 
Statement No disclosure requirement 
Abbreviated format 
Before 2009, medium-sized firms could aggregate 
certain items (e.g., sales, cost of sales, other operating 
income) to gross profit. Since 2009, firms are required to 
report sales information. 
Other 
disclosures Abbreviated notes Expanded abbreviated notes; director’s report 
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Appendix B: Audit Requirements for European Private Firms 
 
This appendix summarizes the audit requirements for private European limited liability firms below and above the small-medium 
audit threshold.  
 
Below audit threshold Above audit threshold 
Austria No mandatory audit 
Mandatory audit by certified auditors or certified accountants; 
while non-audit services (e.g., tax consulting, legal services) are 
allowed, bookkeeping services are prohibited. 
Belgium No mandatory audit 
Mandatory audit by certified auditors; while non-audit services 
(e.g., tax consulting, legal services) are allowed, bookkeeping 
services are prohibited. 
Denmark 
Before 2006, all limited liability firms, 
regardless of size, had to be audited; since 
2006, firms below the threshold are exempt 
from mandatory audit requirements. 
Mandatory audit by certified auditors or certified accountants; 
non-audit services (e.g., tax consulting, legal services) are 
allowed. In certain circumstances, auditors can also provide 
bookkeeping services to audit clients. 
Finland 
Before 2008, all limited liability firms, 
regardless of size, had to be audited; since 
2008, firms below the threshold are exempt 
from mandatory audit requirements. 
Mandatory audit by certified auditors or non-certified auditors; 
auditors may provide non-audit services (e.g., tax consulting, legal 
services), subject to independence requirements. Bookkeeping 
services are not allowed. 
France No mandatory audit Mandatory audit by certified auditors. Non-audit services (e.g., tax consulting, legal services) are generally not allowed. 
Germany No mandatory audit 
Mandatory audit by certified auditors or certified accountants; 
while non-audit services (e.g., tax consulting, legal services) are 
allowed, bookkeeping services are prohibited. 
Ireland No mandatory audit 
Mandatory audit by chartered accountants or certified 
accountants; non-audit services (e.g., tax consulting, legal 
services) are allowed. In certain circumstances, auditors can also 
provide bookkeeping services to audit clients. 
Italy No mandatory audit 
Mandatory audit by firms’ internal board of auditors (Collegio 
Sindacale) or certified auditors; internal board of auditors may 
provide administrative audit and non-audit services (e.g., tax 
consulting, legal services). 
Netherlands No mandatory audit 
Mandatory audit by certified auditors or certified accountants; 
non-audit services (e.g., tax consulting, legal services) are 
allowed. In certain circumstances, auditors can also provide 
bookkeeping services to audit clients. 
Spain No mandatory audit 
Mandatory audit by certified auditors or certified accountants; 
while non-audit services (e.g., tax consulting, legal services) are 
allowed, bookkeeping services are prohibited. 
Sweden 
Before 2011, all limited liability firms, 
regardless of size, had to be audited; since 
2011, firms below the threshold are exempt 
from mandatory audit requirements. 
Mandatory audit by certified auditors or certified accountants; 
non-audit services (e.g., tax consulting, legal services) are 
allowed. In certain circumstances, auditors can also provide 
bookkeeping services to audit clients. 
United 
Kingdom No mandatory audit 
Mandatory audit by chartered accountants or certified 
accountants; non-audit services (e.g., tax consulting, legal 
services) are allowed. In certain circumstances, auditors can also 
provide bookkeeping services to audit clients. 
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Appendix C: Size Classification Thresholds and Source References 
 
This appendix summarizes the small-medium size thresholds for the 12 sample countries between Jan. 1, 2003, and Dec. 31, 2011, and reports sources (e.g., the text of the laws) that 
contain information on the disclosure (Panel A) and audit threshold levels (Panel B) and the dates of the threshold changes. Dates listed are for firms’ reporting end dates. Because our 
sample period starts Jan. 1, 2003, we list that date as the starting date in the “Since” column for all of the countries with audit and disclosure thresholds in effect as of Jan. 1, 2003 (i.e., 
this “Since” date does not mean that Jan. 1, 2003, was the date of the last change in the threshold before the start of the sample period). The number of employees refers to the average 
number of persons employed by the company during the fiscal year. For comparability across countries, we state all total assets and sales threshold levels in euro for all countries. We 
convert the total assets and sales thresholds set in local non-euro currencies (e.g., Danish krone or British pounds) to euro using the average exchange rate when the threshold levels 
were in effect; however, all underlying analyses are conducted in local currencies. The column “Source” includes a second reference when information on threshold levels and dates are 
not included in a single source file. Columns “Levels” and “Dates” provide information on the location of the levels of the thresholds and the dates of the threshold changes within the 
source file, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Disclosure Thresholds 
       
  Since:  Total assets Sales Employees Source Levels Dates 
Austria 
Jan. 1, 2003 3,125,000 6,250,000 50 https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/2000_61_1/2000_61_1.pdf Page 1, Nr. 1 a Page 1, Nr. 3 (2) 
Dec. 31, 2005 3,650,000 7,300,000 50 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2004_I_161/BGBL
A_2004_I_161.pdf Page 1, Nr. 1a (a) Page 4, Nr. 15 (11) 
Dec. 31, 2008 4,840,000 9,680,000 50 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2008_I_70/BGBLA
_2008_I_70.pdf Page 1/2 Nr. 2 (a) Page 8, Nr. 26 (18) 
  
Belgium Jan. 1, 2003 3,125,000 6,250,000 50 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn
=2000021738&table_name=loi Section II, Art. 2 Section V, Art. 6 
Dec. 31, 2004 3,650,000 7,300,000 50 http://www.nbb.be/doc/ba/jur/ent/code%20des%20societes.pdf Page 5, Art. 15, § 1 Page 5, Art. 15, § 1 
 
        
Denmark 
Jan. 1, 2003 2,689,560 5,379,120 50 http://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/english/flaw!fetch.action?libcode=flaw&id=b461664c-d0b8-4286-9f82-242ff98e2e11&classcode=324 Part I, Chapter 1, Sec. 7 (2) 
Part XI, Chapter 25, 
Sec. 165 (1) 
March 31, 2005 3,890,495 7,780,990 50 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/transposition/de
nmark/d14.2-dk.pdf Page 1, § 1, No. 5 Page 8, § 2, Sec. 1 
Aug. 31, 2009 4,833,504 9,667,008 50 https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=117640&exp=1 § 1, No. 4 § 2, Sec. 1 
              
Finland 
Jan. 1, 2003 3,125,000  6,250,000  50 https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2001/20010629 Chapter 3, 9 § Chapter 8, 5 § 
Dec. 31, 2005 3,650,000  7,300,000  50 https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2004/20041304 Chapter 3, 9 § Chapter 8, 6 §, No. 1 
  
              
France 
Jan. 1, 2003 267,000  534,000  10 
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI0000062
58333&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005634379&dateTexte=20110110&oldActi
on=rechCodeArticle; http://www.cnde.fr/Module2.htm 
Art. R123-200, No. 1 
Sec. 2 A 
"L'Obligation est 
simplifiée" (second 
link) 
Dec. 31, 2010 1,000,000  2,000,000  20 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT0000233
17763; 
http://blogonsdroit.blog.free.fr/index.php?post/2011/02/10/Pr%C3%A9sentati
on-simplifi%C3%A9e-des-comptes 
Art. 1er Sec. "Nouveaux 
seuils" (second link) 
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Germany 
Jan. 1, 2003 3,438,000  6,875,000  50 https://www.jurion.de/Gesetze/EuroBilG/1; https://www.jurion.de/Gesetze/EuroBilG/9 Art. 1, No. 1a (aa, bb) Art. 9 (second link) 
Dec. 31, 2004 4,015,000  8,030,000  50 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?start=%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3
D%27bgbl104s3166.pdf%27%5D#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D
%27bgbl104s3166.pdf%27%5D__1489414295520 
Page 3166, No. 3a (aa, bb) Page 3176, Art. 58 (1) 
Dec. 31, 2009 4,840,000  9,680,000  50 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&bk
=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=//*%255B@attr_id=%2527bgbl109s1102.pdf
%2527%255D#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl109s1102.p
df%27%5D__1489414407105 
Page 1105, No. 19a (aa, bb) Page 1118, Art. 66 (2) 
  
              
Ireland Jan. 1, 2003 1,904,607  3,809,214  50 http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1993/en/si/0396.html Part II, Reg. 4 (a, b) Part I, Reg. 2 (1) 
  
              
Italy 
Jan. 1, 2003 3,125,000  6,250,000  50 http://gazzette.comune.jesi.an.it/2001/125/1.htm Art. 1, No. 1 (a, b) Art. 3 
Dec. 12, 2006 3,650,000  7,300,000  50 
http://gazzette.comune.jesi.an.it/2006/276/1.htm; 
http://www.appuntieconomia.it/alpha-test-temi-svolti-esame-di-stato-
economia-commercialist/il-bilancio-abbreviato-bilancio-consolidato.html 
Art. 1, No. 1 (a, b) 
Sec. "Decorrenza dei 
nuovi limiti" (second 
link) 
Nov. 21, 2009 4,400,000  8,800,000  50 
http://www.normattiva.it/uri-
res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2008;173;  
http://www.tuttocamere.it/files/dirsoc/SRL_Nomina_Collegio_Sindacale_CN
DCEC.pdf 
Art. 1, No. 4 (1, 2) 
Page 3/4, Sec. "La 
decorrenza dei nuovi 
limiti" (second link) 
  
              
Netherlands 
Jan. 1, 2003 3,500,000 7,000,000 50 http://parlis.nl/pdf/kamerstukken/KST57382.pdf 
Page 7, Art. IV, Column H, 
Nr. 5a, b Page 10, Art. XI 
Dec. 31, 2004 3,650,000 7,300,000 50 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2004-54.html Artikel 1 Artikel 4 
Dec. 31, 2006 4,400,000 8,800,000 50 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2006-474.html Artikel 1 Artikel 3 
 
            
Spain 
Jan. 1, 2003 2,373,998  4,747,996  50 https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1998/12/24/pdfs/A43557-43601.pdf; http://pdfs.wke.es/4/7/8/8/pd0000014788.pdf 
Page 43577, Sec. "Cuarta 
Parte," I No. 4a (1a) 
Page 12, Table 1 (second 
link) 
Page 43558, Sec. 
"Entrada en vigor" 
Dec. 31, 2008 2,850,000  5,700,000  50 http://www.boe.es/boe_gallego/dias/2007/11/20/pdfs/A00003-00152.pdf Page 44, Reg. 4a, 1(a) Page 8, "Entrada en 
vigor" 
              
Sweden 
Dec. 31, 2007 2,582,500 5,165,000 50 http://www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/sfs/20060871.pdf Page 1, 1 kap., 3 §, No. 3 (a, b, c) Page 9, last sentence 
Oct. 31, 2011 4,408,000 8,816,000 50 http://www.lagboken.se/Views/Pages/GetFile.ashx?portalId=56&cat=59924&docId=638648&propId=5 
Page 1, 1 kap., 3 §, No. 4 (a, 
b, c) Page 2, last sentence 
              
United 
Kingdom 
Jan. 1, 2003 2,024,120 4,048,240 50 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1992/2452/regulation/5/made; http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1992/2452/regulation/1/made Reg. 5 (3) Reg. 1 (second link) 
Jan. 30, 2004 3,944,080 7,888,160 50 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2004/16/pdfs/uksi_20040016_en.pdf Page 1, Reg. 2, 2 (a, b) Page 1, Reg. 1 (2), 7 (1) 
April 5, 2009 3,755,520 7,488,000 50 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/393/pdfs/uksi_20080393_en.pdf Page 2, Part 2, Reg. 3, 1 (a, b) 
Page 1, Part 1, Reg. 
2 (1, 2) 
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Panel B: Audit Thresholds 
 
      
  Since:  Total assets Sales Employees Source Levels Dates 
Austria 
Jan. 1, 2003 3,125,000 6,250,000 50 https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/2000_61_1/2000_61_1.pdf Page 1, Nr. 1 a Page 1, Nr. 3 (2) 
Dec. 31, 2005 3,650,000 7,300,000 50 http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2004_I_161/BGBLA_2004_I_161.pdf Page 1, Nr. 1a (a) Page 4, Nr. 15 (11) 
Dec. 31, 2008 4,840,000 9,680,000 50 http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2008_I_70/BGBLA
_2008_I_70.pdf Page 1/2 Nr. 2 (a) Page 8, Nr. 26 (18) 
 
        
 
    
Belgium 
Jan. 1, 2003 3,125,000 6,250,000 50 http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn
=2000021738&table_name=loi Section II, Art. 2 Section V, Art. 6 
Dec. 31, 2004 3,650,000 7,300,000 50 http://www.nbb.be/doc/ba/jur/ent/code%20des%20societes.pdf Page 5, Art. 15, § 1 Page 5, Art. 15, § 1 
 
  
      
Denmark 
Dec. 31, 2006 201,338 402,676 12 https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/r0710.aspx?id=27278 § 1, No. 50, § 135 (1, 2, 3) § 4, Sec. 3 
Dec. 31, 2011 538,052 1,076,104 12 http://www.fsr.dk/~/media/Files/FSR/Nyheder%20og%20presse/Politiske%20maerkesager/lovforslag%20om%20ndring%20af%20RL.ashx Page 1, § 1, No. 1 Page 2, § 3, Sec. 1 
 
              
Finland June 30, 2008 100,000  200,000  3 http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/2007/en20070459.pdf Page 2, Chapter 2, Sec. 4, 2 (1, 2, 3) 
Page 21, Chapter 11, 
Sec. 56 (1) 
 
              
France Jan. 1, 2003 1,550,000  3,100,000  50 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexteArticle.do;jsessionid=53EF9C4E95
6F43FCDB8BAE8AF3A22AD3.tpdila14v_3?cidTexte=JORFTEXT0000006
74772&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006339916&dateTexte=20150717&categori
eLien=id#LEGIARTI000006339916 
Art. 12 Art. 12 
 
              
Germany 
Jan. 1, 2003 3,438,000  6,875,000  50 https://www.jurion.de/Gesetze/EuroBilG/1; https://www.jurion.de/Gesetze/EuroBilG/9 Art. 1, No. 1a (aa, bb) Art. 9 (second link) 
Dec. 31, 2004 4,015,000  8,030,000  50 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?start=%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3
D%27bgbl104s3166.pdf%27%5D#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D
%27bgbl104s3166.pdf%27%5D__1489414295520 
Page 3166, No. 3a (aa, bb) Page 3176, Art. 58 (1) 
Dec. 31, 2009 4,840,000  9,680,000  50 
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&bk
=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=//*%255B@attr_id=%2527bgbl109s1102.pdf
%2527%255D#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl109s1102.p
df%27%5D__1489414407105 
Page 1105, No. 19a (aa, bb) Page 1118, Art. 66 (2) 
 
              
Ireland 
Jan. 1, 2003 1,904,607  317,434  50 http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/1999/en.act.1999.0030.pdf; http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/2003/02/18/00083.asp 
Page 25, Part III, Reg. 32, 
3a (ii, iii, iv) 
2nd Paragraph 
(second link) 
June 30, 2005 1,904,607  1,500,000  50 http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2003/en.act.2003.0044.pdf; http://www.fdc.ie/auditing.html 
Page 64, Part IV, Reg. 53 
(b)  
2nd Paragraph 
(second link) 
Feb. 24, 2007 3,650,000  7,300,000  50 http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2006/en.act.2006.0041.pdf; http://www.ksapre.com/offshore-company-formation/ireland/ 
Page 12, Part II, Reg. 9, 1b 
(i, ii) 
Sec. "(f) Accounting 
and auditing 
requirements" 
(second link) 
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Italy 
Jan. 1, 2003 3,125,000 6,250,000  50 http://gazzette.comune.jesi.an.it/2001/125/1.htm Art. 1, No. 1 (a, b) Art. 3 
Dec. 12, 2006 3,650,000  7,300,000  50 
http://gazzette.comune.jesi.an.it/2006/276/1.htm; 
http://www.appuntieconomia.it/alpha-test-temi-svolti-esame-di-stato-
economia-commercialist/il-bilancio-abbreviato-bilancio-consolidato.html 
Art. 1, No. 1 (a, b) 
Sec. "Decorrenza dei 
nuovi limiti" (second 
link) 
Nov. 21, 2009 4,400,000  8,800,000  50 
http://www.normattiva.it/uri-
res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2008;173;  
http://www.tuttocamere.it/files/dirsoc/SRL_Nomina_Collegio_Sindacale_CN
DCEC.pdf 
Art. 1, No. 4 (1, 2) 
Page 3/4, Sec. "La 
decorrenza dei nuovi 
limiti" (second link) 
 
              
Netherlands 
Jan. 1, 2003 3,500,000 7,000,000 50 http://parlis.nl/pdf/kamerstukken/KST57382.pdf Page 7, Art. IV, Column H, Nr. 5a, b Page 10, Art. XI 
Dec. 31, 2004 3,650,000 7,300,000 50 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2004-54.html Artikel 1 Artikel 4 
Dec. 31, 2006 4,400,000 8,800,000 50 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2006-474.html Artikel 1 Artikel 3 
 
              
Spain 
Jan. 1, 2003 2,373,998  4,747,996  50 https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1998/12/24/pdfs/A43557-43601.pdf; http://pdfs.wke.es/4/7/8/8/pd0000014788.pdf 
Page 43577, Sec. "Cuarta 
Parte," I No. 4a (1a) 
Page 12, Table 1 (second 
link) 
Page 43558, Sec. 
"Entrada en vigor" 
Dec. 31, 2008 2,850,000  5,700,000  50 http://www.boe.es/boe_gallego/dias/2007/11/20/pdfs/A00003-00152.pdf 
 
Page 44, Reg. 4a, 1(a) Page 8, "Entrada en 
vigor" 
 
              
Sweden Oct. 31, 2011 165,300 330,600 3 http://www.lagboken.se/Views/Pages/GetFile.ashx?portalId=56&cat=59924&docId=638084&propId=5 Page 3, 9 kap., 1 §, No. 1-3 
Page 7/8, 32 kap., 3 
§, No. 1 
 
              
United 
Kingdom 
Jan. 1, 2003 2,030,980 1,450,700 50 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2000/1430/pdfs/uksi_20001430_en.pdf Page 1, Reg. 2 (2) Page 1, Reg. 1 (2) 
March 30, 2004 3,937,360 7,874,720 50 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2004/16/pdfs/uksi_20040016_en.pdf Page 1, Reg. 2, 2 (a, b) Page 3, Reg. 1 (2), 7 (4) 
April 5, 2009 3,755,520 7,488,000 50 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/393/pdfs/uksi_20080393_en.pdf Page 2, Part 2, Reg. 3, 1 (a, b) 
Page 1, Part 1, Reg. 
2 (1, 2) 
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Appendix D: Empirical Methodology to Estimate Size Sacrificed 
 
We first model the effects of income statement disclosure requirements and external audit requirements on 40 bins, each of 
2% width, in the vicinity of the size threshold. We use only the 20 bins below and 20 bins above the threshold to avoid the 
influence of unusual distributional properties in the extremes of the distribution. This approach is a simple extension of the logit 
model in Eq. (1) to the following multinomial logit: 
(3) Bin	(j), =γ/ +γ/ ∗ Income	statement	disclosure, +γ/ ∗ External	audit, +ε, 
where j = {-19, …, -1, +1, …, +20} and bin j = -20 serves as the base. The dependent variable is the location of the firm-year 
observation among the 40 bins in the vicinity of the assets threshold; the independent variables are indicator variables as defined 
above. We use the parameter estimates for Eq. (3) to estimate the density of the assets distribution, conditional on (1) the 
presence of income statement disclosure requirements at the threshold but not external audit requirements and, separately, (2) the 
presence of external audit requirements at the threshold but not income statement disclosure requirements.  
Next we compare the multinomial estimated size distributions to size distributions constructed to approximate the 
counterfactual case of no size management. Specifically, we estimate the density of the size distribution expected in the bins in 
the vicinity of the size threshold, under the counterfactual assumption of no size management, following the empirical approach 
of Kleven and Waseem (2013). The expected density in the bins in the vicinity of the threshold is interpolated from the 
multinomial estimated density in the remainder of the distribution based on the following fifth-order polynomial approximation: 
(4) Density	(bin	j) = ∑ θ3435 ∗ Assets	midpoint/3 + Intercept	shifters	for	affected	intervals +ε/ 
where the dependent variable is the multinomial estimated density of each bin (again, each of 2% width). Assets midpoint is the 
midpoint of each bin as a percentage of the threshold—for example, 0.99 for the bin immediately below the threshold and 1.05 
for the third bin above the threshold. The intercept shifters are indicator variables for the bins conjectured to be affected by size 
management, where the range of affected bins is estimated as explained below. These indicator variables ensure the estimated 
coefficients on the assets midpoint variables (∑ θ3435 ) are independent of size management in the affected bins. We then 
estimate the counterfactual distribution as the predicted values of Eq. (4), based on just the polynomial approximation terms, i.e., 
excluding the intercept shifters for the affected intervals. Thus the estimated counterfactual distribution for the intervals in the 
vicinity of the threshold affected by size management is smooth.  
The range of bins affected by size management is unknown, so we estimate the range via an iterative process based on the 
following intuition. If firms manage the size variable from bins immediately above the threshold to bins immediately below it, 
then the excess number of observations below in the observed distribution should equal the deficiency in the number of 
observations above. We fix the lower bound of the range at the left endpoint of the bin where the shape of the distribution appears 
to change due to size management. (Ex post, we validate the subjective choice of the lower bound by ensuring the difference 
between the multinomial estimated density and the counterfactual density is not consistently positive for multiple bins 
immediately below the lower bound.) We initially set the upper bound at the right endpoint of the first bin above the threshold 
and then estimate the counterfactual distribution using Eq. (4), iteratively expanding the upper bound of the range to the right 
endpoint of the next bin until the deficiency above the threshold approximates, within 10%, the excess below the threshold. For 
both the estimates of size sacrificed due to income statement disclosure requirements and the estimates of size sacrificed due to 
external audit requirements, this process results in an estimated range of affected bins that comprises nine bins, the three bins 
immediately below and the six bins immediately above the threshold. Thus we report results for Eq. (4) estimated with nine 
intercept shifter terms corresponding to these nine affected intervals. 
Panel A below presents the results of this analysis for the case of income statement disclosure requirements, while Panel B 
presents results for the case of external audit requirements. For both panels, we compare the multinomial estimated densities in 
the nine affected bins to the counterfactual estimates and then translate these into estimates of the average amount of assets 
sacrificed to manage size downward. For purposes of calculating the weighted average number of bins managed, the 
counterfactual density for bin six (marked ^) is reset so that the sum of the differences above versus below the threshold in the 
excluded interval is exactly zero. We assume that the average movement from one bin to the next equals the bin width, 2% of the 
size threshold. The average number of bins managed estimates the average number of bins each size manager manages 
downward, based on the proportions of excess observations in the bins below the threshold. For example, 1.39, the average 
number of bins managed by firms moving from the bin immediately above the threshold (see Panel A), equals (0.0025/0.0037)*1 
bin + (0.0010/0.0037)*2 bins + (0.0002/0.0037)*3 bins. The weighted-average bins managed is the average number of bins 
managed weighted by the proportion of observations managing size downward from that bin relative to the number of 
observations managed from all bins above the threshold. For example, 0.50, the component of the weighted-average for firms 
moving from the bin immediately above the threshold, equals (0.0013/0.0037)*1.39 bins. 
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Panel A: Size Sacrificed to Avoid Income Statement Disclosure Requirements 
 
Bin relative to 
threshold 
Multinomial 
estimated 
density 
Counterfactual 
density Difference 
Average number 
of bins managed 
Weighted-
average bins 
managed 
-3 0.0249 0.0247 0.0002 
-2 0.0248 0.0238 0.0010 
-1 0.0255 0.0230 0.0025 
1 0.0209 0.0223 -0.0013 1.39 0.50 
2 0.0209 0.0215 -0.0006 2.39 0.41 
3 0.0203 0.0208 -0.0005 3.39 0.45 
4 0.0198 0.0201 -0.0003 4.39 0.37 
5 0.0191 0.0195 -0.0004 5.39 0.51 
6 0.0187 0.0193^ -0.0006 6.39 1.01 
3.24 bins 
 
 
Panel B: Size Sacrificed to Avoid External Audit Requirements 
 
Bin relative to 
threshold 
Multinomial 
estimated 
density 
Counterfactual 
density Difference 
Average number 
of bins managed 
Weighted-
average bins 
managed 
-3 0.0245 0.0241 0.0004 
-2 0.0234 0.0232 0.0002 
-1 0.0233 0.0223 0.0010 
1 0.0211 0.0215 -0.0005 1.64 0.48 
2 0.0205 0.0208 -0.0002 2.64 0.40 
3 0.0196 0.0200 -0.0004 3.64 0.98 
4 0.0191 0.0193 -0.0003 4.64 0.79 
5 0.0185 0.0187 -0.0001 5.64 0.42 
6 0.0179 0.0180^ -0.0001 6.64 0.28 
3.35 bins 
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Figure 1 
Total Assets for UK Private Firms by Sub-period. 
This figure presents distributions of total assets for private limited liability firms in the UK separately for three sub-periods 
(see Table 2). In Panels A–C, the superimposed vertical lines demarcate the active, or in-force, size threshold between small and 
medium classification. In Panels D–F, the superimposed vertical lines demarcate the previous, or no longer in-force, size 
threshold between small and medium classification. For this figure only, we present amounts in local currency (British pounds), 
rather than euro, so the active threshold in sub-period t is stated at the same level as the previous threshold in sub-period t+1 (i.e., 
so differences in exchange rates in different sub-periods do not affect the graphs). Bin sizes are 2% of the threshold. The y-axis is 
rescaled for each sub-period for easier comparison. The SD statistics are left standardized difference test statistics as defined by 
Burgstahler and Chuk (2015). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75
0
15
00
22
50
30
00
Fr
e
qu
e
n
cy
840000 1120000 1400000 1680000 1960000
Total Assets
SD statistic = 3.61***
Reporting dates Jan 1 2003 through Jan 29 2004
A: Distribution of Total Assets- Active Threshold
40
00
80
00
12
00
0
16
00
0
Fr
e
qu
e
n
cy
1680000 2240000 2800000 3360000 3920000
Total Assets
SD statistic = 16.87***
Reporting dates Mar 30 2004 through Apr 4 2009
B: Distribution of Total Assets- Active Threshold
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
Fr
e
qu
e
n
cy
1956000 2608000 3260000 3912000 4564000
Total Assets
SD statistic = 14.31***
Reporting dates Apr 5 2009 through Dec 31 2011
C: Distribution of Total Assets- Active Threshold
75
0
15
00
22
50
30
00
Fr
e
qu
e
n
cy
420000 560000 700000 840000 980000
Total Assets
SD statistic = -1.06
Reporting dates Jan 1 2003 through Jan 29 2004
D: Distribution of Total Assets- Previous Threshold
40
00
80
00
12
00
0
16
00
0
Fr
e
qu
e
n
cy
840000 1120000 1400000 1680000 1960000
Total Assets
SD statistic = -0.35
Reporting dates Mar 30 2004 through Apr 4 2009
E: Distribution of Total Assets- Previous Threshold
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
Fr
e
qu
e
nc
y
1680000 2240000 2800000 3360000 3920000
Total Assets
SD statistic = 1.16
Reporting dates Apr 5 2009 through Dec 31 2011
F: Distribution of Total Assets- Previous Threshold
 47
Figure 2  
Pooled Total Assets at Coinciding Disclosure and Audit Thresholds. 
This figure presents distributions of total assets for private limited liability firms in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK in periods when the disclosure and audit thresholds 
coincide. Superimposed vertical lines demarcate the size threshold between small and medium classification. The SD statistics are the left standardized difference test statistics as 
defined by Burgstahler and Chuk (2015). Bin size is 2% of the threshold. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 1 
Disclosure Requirements for European Private Firms. 
This table summarizes the disclosure requirements for private European limited liability firms below and above the small-
medium disclosure threshold. Abbreviated format disclosures, expanded abbreviated format disclosures, and full format 
disclosures are differentiated by the level of detail each presents. See Appendix A for a more complete description of disclosure 
requirements by country. 
 
Below disclosure threshold Above disclosure threshold 
Austria 
Balance Sheet Abbreviated format Expanded abbreviated format 
Income Statement No disclosure requirement Abbreviated format 
Other disclosures Abbreviated notes Expanded abbreviated notes; director’s report 
 
Belgium 
Balance Sheet Abbreviated format Full format 
Income Statement Abbreviated format Full format 
Other disclosures Abbreviated notes Notes; director’s report 
 
Denmark 
Balance Sheet Abbreviated format Full format 
Income Statement Abbreviated format Full format 
Other disclosures Abbreviated notes Notes; director’s report 
 
Finland 
Balance Sheet Abbreviated format Full format 
Income Statement Full format Full format 
Other disclosures Expanded abbreviated notes Notes; director’s report; cash flow statement 
 
France 
Balance Sheet Abbreviated format Full format 
Income Statement Abbreviated format Full format 
Other disclosures Abbreviated notes Notes; director’s report 
 
Germany 
Balance Sheet Abbreviated format Expanded abbreviated format 
Income Statement No disclosure requirement Abbreviated format 
Other disclosures Abbreviated notes Expanded abbreviated notes; director’s report 
 
Ireland 
Balance Sheet Abbreviated format Full format 
Income Statement No disclosure requirement Abbreviated format 
Other disclosures Abbreviated notes Expanded abbreviated notes; director’s report 
 
Italy 
Balance Sheet Abbreviated format Full format 
Income Statement Abbreviated format Full format 
Other disclosures Abbreviated notes Notes; director’s report 
 
Netherlands 
Balance Sheet Abbreviated format Expanded abbreviated format 
Income Statement No disclosure requirement Abbreviated format 
Other disclosures Abbreviated notes Expanded abbreviated notes; director’s report 
 
Spain 
Balance Sheet Abbreviated format Full format 
Income Statement Abbreviated format Abbreviated format 
Other disclosures Abbreviated notes Expanded abbreviated notes; director’s report; 
cash flow statement 
 
Sweden 
Balance Sheet Abbreviated format Full format 
Income Statement Abbreviated format Full format 
Other disclosures Abbreviated notes Notes; director’s report; cash flow statement 
 
United 
Kingdom 
Balance Sheet Abbreviated format Full format 
Income Statement No disclosure requirement Abbreviated format 
Other disclosures Abbreviated notes Expanded abbreviated notes; director’s report 
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Table 2 
Size Classification Thresholds by Country and Period. 
This table summarizes the small-medium size thresholds for the 12 sample countries between Jan. 1, 2003, and Dec. 31, 
2011. Dates listed are for firms’ reporting end dates. Because our sample period starts Jan. 1, 2003, we list that date as the 
starting date in the “Since” column for all of the countries with audit and disclosure thresholds in effect as of Jan. 1, 2003 (i.e., 
this “Since” date does not mean that Jan. 1, 2003, was the date of the last change in the threshold before the start of the sample 
period). The number of employees refers to the average number of persons employed by the company during the fiscal year. For 
comparability across countries, we state all total assets and sales threshold levels in euro for all countries. We convert the total 
assets and sales thresholds set in local, non-euro currencies (e.g., Danish krone) to euro using the average exchange rate when the 
threshold levels were in effect; however, all underlying analyses are conducted in local currencies. Audit threshold amounts that 
do not coincide with disclosure thresholds are bolded and italicized. The non-bold but different assets and sales threshold levels 
shown in Panels A and B for the UK before April 5, 2009, are because the disclosure thresholds shifted two months earlier than 
the audit thresholds in 2004, a minor timing mismatch that results in a different average exchange rate.  
 
  Panel A: Disclosure Thresholds   Panel B: Audit Thresholds 
  Since:  Total assets Sales Employees   Since:  Total assets Sales Employees 
Austria  
Jan. 1, 2003 3,125,000 6,250,000 50   Jan. 1, 2003 3,125,000 6,250,000 50 
Dec. 31, 2005 3,650,000 7,300,000 50   Dec. 31, 2005 3,650,000 7,300,000 50 
Dec. 31, 2008 4,840,000 9,680,000 50   Dec. 31, 2008 4,840,000 9,680,000 50 
  
        
  
  
      
Belgium Jan. 1, 2003 3,125,000 6,250,000 50   Jan. 1, 2003 3,125,000 6,250,000 50 
Dec 31, 2004 3,650,000 7,300,000 50   Dec. 31, 2004 3,650,000 7,300,000 50 
  
        
          
Denmark 
Jan. 1, 2003 2,689,560 5,379,120 50   Dec. 31, 2006 201,338 402,676 12 
March 31, 2005 3,890,495 7,780,990 50   Dec. 31, 2011 538,052 1,076,104 12 
Aug. 31, 2009 4,833,504 9,667,008 50           
  
        
          
Finland  Jan. 1, 2003 3,125,000 6,250,000 50   June 30, 2008 100,000 200,000 3 
Dec. 31, 2005 3,650,000 7,300,000 50           
  
        
          
France  Jan. 1, 2003 267,000 534,000 10   Jan. 1, 2003 1,550,000 3,100,000 50 
Dec. 31, 2010 1,000,000 2,000,000 20           
  
        
          
Germany 
Jan. 1, 2003 3,438,000 6,875,000 50   Jan. 1, 2003 3,438,000 6,875,000 50 
Dec. 31, 2004 4,015,000 8,030,000 50   Dec. 31, 2004 4,015,000 8,030,000 50 
Dec. 31, 2009 4,840,000 9,680,000 50   Dec. 31, 2009 4,840,000 9,680,000 50 
  
        
  
  
      
Ireland 
Jan. 1, 2003 1,904,607 3,809,214 50   Jan. 1, 2003 1,904,607 317,434 50 
          June 30, 2005 1,904,607 1,500,000 50 
          Feb. 24, 2007 3,650,000 7,300,000 50 
  
        
          
Italy 
Jan. 1, 2003 3,125,000 6,250,000 50   Jan. 1, 2003 3,125,000 6,250,000 50 
Dec. 12, 2006 3,650,000 7,300,000 50   Dec. 12, 2006 3,650,000 7,300,000 50 
Nov. 21, 2009 4,400,000 8,800,000 50   Nov. 21, 2009 4,400,000 8,800,000 50 
  
        
          
Netherlands 
Jan. 1, 2003 3,500,000 7,000,000 50   Jan. 1, 2003 3,500,000 7,000,000 50 
Dec. 31, 2004 3,650,000 7,300,000 50   Dec. 31, 2004 3,650,000 7,300,000 50 
Dec. 31, 2006 4,400,000 8,800,000 50   Dec. 31, 2006 4,400,000 8,800,000 50 
  
        
  
  
      
Spain Jan. 1, 2003 2,373,998 4,747,996 50   Jan. 1, 2003 2,373,998 4,747,996 50 
Dec. 31, 2008 2,850,000 5,700,000 50   Dec. 31, 2008 2,850,000 5,700,000 50 
  
        
          
Sweden Dec. 31, 2007 2,582,500 5,165,000 50   Oct. 31, 2011 165,300 330,600 3 
Oct. 31, 2011 4,408,000 8,816,000 50           
  
        
          
United 
Kingdom 
Jan. 1, 2003 2,024,120 4,048,240 50   Jan. 1, 2003 2,030,980 1,450,700 50 
Jan. 30, 2004 3,944,080 7,888,160 50   March 30, 2004 3,937,360 7,874,720 50 
April 5, 2009 3,755,520 7,488,000 50   April 5, 2009 3,755,520 7,488,000 50 
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Table 3 
Sample Selection Procedure. 
This table summarizes the steps of the sample selection process. Panel A shows the attrition of unique firm-year observations available at all levels of the size distributions. Panel B 
shows the attrition of size-variable observations (each firm-year observation can have up to three size-variable observations). 
 
Panel A: Firm-Year Observations 
            
 
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden UK Total 
Single account firm-
year observations 
within the sample 
period 
679,782 2,794,715 824,553 957,658 6,947,687 5,780,829 843,775 5,939,260 4,051,965 5,380,630 2,066,215 10,362,042 46,629,111 
Less: public firms, 
firms in finance, 
insurance, and public 
administration, non-
limited liability firms, 
and firms using IFRS 
-67,658 -1,342,210 -243,115 -57,511 -2,622,321 -1,082,671 -306,118 -1,625,698 -425,002 -703,951 -51,686 -863,331 -9,391,272 
Selected unique firm-
years available 612,124 1,452,505 581,438 900,147 4,325,366 4,698,158 537,657 4,313,562 3,626,963 4,676,679 2,014,529 9,498,711 37,237,839 
              
Panel B: Size-Variable Observations 
 
           
Available observations 
within 2% of active or 
inactive thresholds 
10,804 3,348 14,206 13,240 158,943 51,422 4,403 84,618 35,159 56,716 11,927 83,194 527,980 
Less: observations due 
to violation of 
assumption of data 
smoothness  
-3,779 -0 -0 -727 -0 -17,081 -0 -0 -2,727 -0 -0 -0 -24,314 
Baseline sample of 
available observations  7,025 3,348 14,206 12,513 158,943 34,341 4,403 84,618 32,432 56,716 11,927 83,194 503,666 
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Table 4 
Cross-Country Size Management Regressions: Baseline Specification. 
This table presents the results of estimating Eq. (1) using a logit model. The dependent variable equals one if the observation is in the 
bin immediately below the threshold and zero if the observation is in the bin immediately above, where bin size is 2% of the threshold. 
Expanded disclosure equals one if expanded public disclosure requirements are imposed at the threshold to which the observation is 
adjacent and zero otherwise. External audit equals one if a mandatory audit requirement is imposed at the threshold to which the 
observation is adjacent and zero otherwise. Z-statistics, shown in parentheses, are calculated using standard errors clustered by country-
size variable-year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
MODEL Prediction  1 2 3 4 5 
             
Expanded disclosure (+) 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.028** 0.027** 
(3.58) (3.27) (3.07) (2.34) (2.29) 
External audit (+) 0.145*** 0.153*** 0.154*** 0.144*** 0.132*** 
(8.79) (9.50) (9.33) (7.51) (6.46) 
Constant 0.028*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.030*** 
(6.71) (10.28) (9.93) (8.50) (6.82) 
 
Country-year fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes No 
Exclude thresholds that impose sales and 
employee count disclosure? No No Yes Yes Yes 
Only include assets thresholds? No No No Yes Yes 
 
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
N   503,666 503,666 490,508 349,775 349,775 
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Table 5 
Cross-Country Size Management Regressions: Disclosure Decomposition. 
This table presents the results of estimating a variant of Eq. (1) using a logit model. The dependent variable equals one if the 
observation is in the bin immediately below the threshold and zero if the observation is in the bin immediately above, where bin size is 
2% of the threshold. Income statement disclosure equals one if income statement disclosure is required above the threshold to which the 
observation is adjacent but not below and zero otherwise. Cash flow statement disclosure equals one if cash flow statement disclosure is 
required above the threshold to which the observation is adjacent but not below and zero otherwise. Other disclosure equals one if 
expanded public disclosure requirements other than cash flow statement or income statement disclosure are imposed at the threshold to 
which the observation is adjacent and zero otherwise. External audit equals one if a mandatory audit requirement is imposed at the 
threshold to which the observation is adjacent and zero otherwise. Z-statistics, shown in parentheses, are calculated using standard errors 
clustered by country-size variable-year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
MODEL Prediction  1 2 3 4 5 
             
Income statement disclosure (+) 0.124*** 0.091** 0.094** 0.134*** 0.160*** 
(3.83) (2.55) (2.50) (3.57) (4.53) 
Cash flow statement disclosure (+) 0.011 0.020 0.021 -0.012 -0.022 
(0.40) (0.66) (0.68) (-0.57) (-1.38) 
Other disclosure (+) 0.015* 0.014* 0.013 -0.003 -0.002 
(1.89) (1.75) (1.54) (-0.29) (-0.18) 
External audit (+) 0.106*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.094*** 0.071*** 
(7.29) (7.59) (7.65) (6.52) (5.26) 
Constant 0.033*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.037*** 
(9.00) (5.84) (5.39) (4.85) (9.96) 
 
Country-year fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes No 
Exclude thresholds that impose sales and 
employee count disclosure? No No Yes Yes Yes 
Only include assets thresholds? No No No Yes Yes 
 
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
N   503,666 503,666 490,508 349,775 349,775 
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Table 6 
Determinants of Size Management. 
This table presents the results of estimating Eq. (2) using a logit model. The sample is restricted to UK firm-year observations with 
fiscal years ending 2003–2011. For this analysis, we exclude firms above the threshold that do not disclose income statement 
information as well as firms below the threshold that do. The dependent variable is measured in year t. The independent variables in 
levels are measured in year t-1. The independent variables in changes are measured between t-2 and t-1. The dependent variable equals 
one if the observation is in the bin immediately below the threshold and zero if the observation is in the bin immediately above, where 
bin size is 2% of the threshold. Change in firm equity equals the change in total equity of the firm, scaled by total assets. Assets growth 
equals the change in total assets, scaled by total assets. Noncurrent liabilities equal the noncurrent liabilities of the firm, scaled by total 
assets. The proportion below threshold for peers equals the mean of the dependent variable for firms in the same industry (three-digit 
NAICS) and year, excluding the firm itself. Herfindahl index is formed by four-digit NAICS and is constructed using total assets of UK 
firms with publicly disclosed financial statements. Market share of public rivals equals the percentage of total assets in the four-digit 
NAICS industry held by public firms. Intangibility equals intangible assets, scaled by total assets. Year incorporated equals the year in 
which the firm was formed. Inventory intensity equals the inventory of the firm, scaled by total assets. Number of shareholders equals 
the number of shareholders reported on Amadeus as of January 2012. Fixed asset intensity equals the total fixed assets of the firm, scaled 
by total assets. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels to mitigate the effects of outliers. Z-statistics, shown in 
parentheses, are calculated using heteroskedastic-consistent Huber-White standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Model Prediction 1 2 3 4 
Change in firm equity (+) 0.696*** 1.187*** 1.144*** 1.166*** 
(2.58) (4.09) (3.94) (4.02) 
Assets growth (+) 0.188** 0.216** 0.212** 0.218** 
(2.19) (2.29) (2.19) (2.30) 
Noncurrent liabilities (+) 0.766*** 0.448*** 0.396*** 0.448*** 
(6.78) (3.41) (2.87) (3.38) 
Proportion below threshold for peers (+) 0.743*** 
(3.09) 
Herfindahl index (?) -1.863*** 0.750 -1.808*** 
(-2.84) (0.74) (-2.71) 
Market share of public rivals (?) 0.757 -0.820 0.630 
(1.62) (-1.16) (1.34) 
Intangibility (+) -2.134 -0.458 -2.190 
(-1.14) (-0.23) (-1.16) 
Year incorporated (+) 0.004** 0.006*** 0.004* 
(2.06) (2.87) (1.94) 
Inventory intensity (?) 0.741*** 0.636*** 0.740*** 
(5.23) (3.86) (5.19) 
Number of shareholders (?) 0.200*** 0.191*** 0.196*** 
(8.98) (8.50) (8.80) 
Fixed assets intensity (?) 0.840*** 0.687*** 0.826*** 
(8.81) (6.24) (8.59) 
Constant (?) 0.972*** -7.891** -11.409*** -7.891** 
(28.18) (-2.00) (-2.63) (-1.99) 
Year and industry (three-digit NAICS) 
fixed effects? No No Yes No 
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.0402 0.0786 0.0415 
N 7,944 7,147 7,104 7,123 
 
 
 
